The Polish Politics Blog

Analysis of the contemporary Polish political scene

Month: July, 2015

Does the Polish left have a future?

Struggling in the opinion polls, Poland’s left-wing parties have formed an electoral alliance to contest October’s parliamentary election. However, the as-yet-unnamed coalition faces formidable obstacles and there is still a real prospect that no left-wing groupings will be represented in parliament after the autumn poll, whose outcome could determine the shape of the Polish political scene for years to come.

The rise and fall of Mr Palikot

The Polish left is in deep crisis. For the last decade the political scene has been dominated by the centrist Civic Platform (PO), currently the main governing party, and the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party, the main opposition grouping. Although it remains the main party on the left, the once-powerful communist successor Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), which governed the country from 1993-97 and 2001-5, has been in the doldrums since its support collapsed in the 2005 parliamentary election following a series of spectacular high level corruption scandals. At the most recent 2011 parliamentary poll the party suffered its worst ever defeat slumping to fifth place with only 8% of the vote.

At the same time, a centre-left challenger emerged in the form of the anti-clerical liberal Palikot Movement (RP) which was formed at the end of 2010 by Janusz Palikot, a controversial and flamboyant businessman and one-time Civic Platform parliamentarian, and came from nowhere to finish third in the 2011 election with just over 10% of the vote. However, Mr Palikot’s party failed to capitalise on its success, struggling with its political identity and finding it difficult to decide whether it was really a left-wing party at all or more of an economically and socially liberal centrist grouping. While Mr Palikot clearly had a talent for attracting substantial media interest, many Poles regarded him as an unpredictable maverick who used coarse, often brutal, rhetoric, and grew tired of his erratic behaviour and political zig-zags.

At the end of 2013, Mr Palikot tried to re-invent his party as ‘Your Movement’ (TR), promising to tone down the strong anti-clericalism and social liberalism on which his earlier electoral success was based while placing greater emphasis on free-market economics. He also tried to broaden out his party’s appeal by contesting the May 2014 European Parliament (EP) election as part of the centre-left ‘Europa Plus’ electoral coalition, hoping to benefit from the (at least nominal) sponsorship of Aleksander Kwaśniewski, a very popular Democratic Left Alliance-backed two-term President of Poland (1995-2005) who many commentators saw as the one of the few politicians with the potential to transform the Polish left’s electoral fortunes. However, re-branding the party simply further confused its remaining supporters while Mr Kwaśniewski’s involvement in ‘Europa Plus’ was half-hearted to say the least and on occasions he appeared more of a liability than an asset. In the event, the coalition finished seventh in the EP poll securing only 3.6% of the votes, while Your Movement’s parliamentary caucus imploded as most of its deputies defected to other parties.

Presidential election disaster

Meanwhile, Leszek Miller, who was previously party leader from 1997-2004, took over the leadership of the Democratic Left Alliance following its 2011 election drubbing. Mr Miller is a wily political operator who, in his heyday, led the party to victory in the 2001 parliamentary election and served as prime minister from 2001-2004, overseeing Poland’s accession to the EU. Nonetheless, in spite of seeing off the challenge from Mr Palikot and emerging once again as the main standard bearer of the left, the Alliance continued to lag well behind the two main parties in the polls, securing third place in the EP election but with only 9.4% of the vote (compared with 12.3% in 2009). There was worse to come in last November’s local elections when the party finished fourth in the regional assembly polls (the best indicator of national party support), seeing its vote share slump from 15.2% in 2010 to only 8.8%. Critics argued that Mr Miller looked increasingly like a figure from a by-gone era and lacked any clear strategic vision of how to expand the party’s support beyond its declining base of older voters linked to the previous communist regime.

Knowing that they faced almost-certain defeat, the Alliance struggled to find high profile, party-aligned figures willing to contest May’s presidential election and ended up selecting a political unknown, 35-year-old historian and TV personality Magdalena Ogórek, as its candidate. Ms Ogórek’s candidacy was designed to freshen-up the party’s image and open it up to a new generation of voters as she tried instead to position herself as an anti-establishment figure who could articulate the concerns of alienated Polish youth. However, although Ms Ogórek generated huge media interest much of this was due to her striking appearance and, lacking any real political experience, she ran a poor campaign that was dogged by controversy from the outset. Ms Ogórek was much derided for her reluctance to answer questions in press conferences and give extended national media interviews, and her policy statements included a controversial pledge to re-write Polish law from scratch. She also disorientated left-wing and socially liberal voters by appearing to champion free market economic policies and taking an ambiguous stance on moral-cultural issues such as abortion and the role of the Catholic Church in public life. Although happy to draw on the Alliance’s funds and local organisational structures, Ms Ogórek ran her campaign almost completely independently of the party and ended up distancing herself from the left by refusing to answer questions about whom she had voted for in the past.

In the event Ms Ogórek obtained a humiliating 2.4% of the vote, the party’s worst ever performance in a national election, although Mr Miller managed to see off a potential revolt against his leadership and forced his most high profile critic, former leader Grzegorz Napieralski, out of the party. Moreover, in spite of running a very energetic campaign Mr Palikot’s performance was even worse, finishing seventh with only 1.4%. Two former Palikot Movement deputies who stood as independent left-wing candidates – veteran feminist campaigner Wanda Nowicka, who was supported by the small Labour Union (UP), and Anna Grodzka, Poland’s first trans-sexual parliamentarian and candidate of the tiny Green party (Zieloni) – could not even collect the 100,000 signatures required to get on the ballot paper.

Searching for left unity

The presidential election catastrophe – together with polls suggesting that no left-wing grouping, not even the Democratic Left Alliance, would cross the 5% threshold required for parties to secure parliamentary representation – confirmed the sense of deep crisis on the left and appeared to convince many of its younger leaders that their only hope was to put aside their differences and contest the October 25th parliamentary election on a united ticket. The unity initiative was sponsored by the All-Poland Trade Union Agreement (OPZZ) federation, which has its origins in the previous regime, and culminated in the Democratic Left Alliance, Your Movement and the Greens (joined later by other, smaller left-wing groupings) forming an electoral coalition known provisionally as the ‘United Left’ (Zjednoczona Lewica) on the basis of a rather vague 15-point minimum programme whose details are not yet known.

However, the United Left still faces a number of formidable obstacles. Firstly, a number of smaller left-wing parties have disassociated themselves from the initiative. These include the ‘Red-and-Whites’ (Biało-Czerwoni) – a new grouping set up last month by Mr Napieralski and former Your Movement spokesman Andrzej Rozenek, who resigned from the party following allegations of financial irregularities against Mr Palikot – and the ‘Together’ (Razem) party formed by a number of young, radical left intellectuals and modelled on the Spanish ‘Podemos’ movement. Both groupings refuse to be associated with any unity initiatives sponsored by the Democratic Left Alliance whom they accuse of having discredited the left. Although organisationally and financially stronger than any other left-wing grouping, during its eight years in office the Alliance neglected many issues important to the left and lacks credibility among many potential centre-left voters who view the party as simply an unprincipled life raft for former communist regime functionaries.

Moreover, because its weakness is the consequence of many years of ideological and personal divisions, the Polish left is characterised by deep animosities between its main protagonists. Indeed, such unity initiatives have often foundered on competing ambitions and personal rivalries, and the really tough negotiations, over the composition of the candidate lists, are still to come. Even if this difficult issue can be resolved, the problem with contesting the election as an electoral alliance is, apart from the fact that the new grouping lacks name recognition among voters, that under Poland’s election rules a coalition needs to cross a higher 8% threshold to secure parliamentary representation. One way around this would be to register as a ‘civic’ electoral committee which would only be subject to a 5% threshold, but this would not be eligible for the generous state funding available to parties that secure more than 3% of the vote. Finally, even if it enters parliament, the left will still be a marginal actor; although, depending on how the battle between the two main parties plays out, it may emerge as a potential junior governing coalition partner.

More broadly, while various surveys have put the number of Poles who identify themselves as being on the left at around 25-30%, the bigger, over-arching electoral-strategic challenge is to develop an appeal that can bring together its two potential bases of support: socially liberal and economically leftist voters. The kind of socially liberal voters who tend to be younger and better-off, prioritise moral-cultural issues, and in Western Europe would incline naturally towards left-wing parties, in Poland are often quite economically liberal as well. They were at one time Mr Palikot’s core electorate and many of them still support Civic Platform; indeed, some analysts argue that the ruling party ‘borrowed’ many of these potential centre-left voters, who supported the grouping as the most effective way of keeping Law and Justice out of office, and has no intention of giving them back!

The economically leftist electorate, on the other hand, tends to be older and more culturally conservative; indeed, for this reason many of those who are nostalgic for the job security and guaranteed social minimum that they associate with the former communist regime often incline towards supporting right-wing parties such as Law and Justice. Arguably the only deep social roots that the Polish left, and Democratic Left Alliance in particular, have are among those steadily declining sections of the electorate that have some kind of sentiment towards, or interests linking them to, the previous regime, such as families connected to the military and former security services.

A new formula needed?

After a decade in the political wilderness, the Polish left is in dire straits and haunted by the spectre of an ‘Irish scenario’: where two centrist, broadly liberal-conservative parties dominate the political scene with the left a permanently marginalised third force. Indeed, there is a real possibility that there will be no left-wing parties represented in the Polish parliament after the October parliamentary election. The best that the Democratic Left Alliance, and Polish left more generally, can realistically hope for is that they recover enough ground to be a junior partner in a two or three-party Civic Platform-led coalition government. Indeed, some commenters argue that the demise of the Democratic Left Alliance and current left-wing elites is both inevitable and even desirable, and that the left needs to develop a completely new political formula and set of leaders – such as Barbara Nowacka, Your Movement’s media-friendly co-chair, who is tipped by many as a future leader of the Polish left – if it is renew itself and develop an effective long-term challenge to the Civic Platform-Law and Justice duopoly.

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Can Civic Platform recover?

An unexpected presidential election defeat plunged Poland’s ruling party into a serious crisis, deepened by the return of a wiretapping scandal that it had hoped would fade away but ended up forcing a government re-shuffle. While it is too early to write the ruling party off, it is struggling to respond effectively to a strong public backlash against the current political elite.

A shock presidential election defeat

In the run-up to the May presidential election, the ruling centrist Civic Platform (PO) had been running neck-and-neck in opinion polls with the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party, the main opposition grouping, and some even showed it pulling slightly ahead. A key element of Civic Platform leader and prime minister Ewa Kopacz’s political strategy was using the widely-predicted resounding victory of the ruling party-backed incumbent Bronisław Komorowski, possibly even in the first round of voting, to create a wave of popular enthusiasm that would carry her party through to victory in the more important autumn parliamentary election. However, Mr Komorowski’s shock defeat by Andrzej Duda, the Law and Justice-backed candidate, left the ruling party’s strategy in tatters and have changed the dynamics of the parliamentary poll, leading to an upsurge in support for the right-wing opposition which most polls now put ahead by around 10%.

The presidential election result also suggested that Civic Platform could no longer rely on its previously successful strategy of mobilising reluctant supporters by generating fear of an opposition victory. The ruling party’s claim to a better guarantor of stability than the confrontational and allegedly authoritarian style of politics that many voters (rightly or wrongly) associate with Law and Justice and its combative leader Jarosław Kaczyński was a key element in all of its recent, successful election campaigns but was not effective this time around.

At the same time, the equally surprising presidential election success of charismatic former rock star Paweł Kukiz – who, standing as an ‘anti-system’ candidate, secured more than one-fifth of the first round votes – could radically alter future coalition configurations. Up until now, Law and Justice appeared to have no obvious coalition partners among the main parliamentary groupings which meant that, even if it ‘won’ the parliamentary election, Civic Platform could still end up remaining in office. The possible entry into parliament of a substantial ‘anti-system’ right-wing bloc clustered around Mr Kukiz opens up a potential pathway to power for Mr Kaczyński’s party. Post-presidential election polls show support for Mr Kukiz’s (as yet un-named) grouping, which sees the replacement of the country’s proportional electoral system with one based on single-member constituencies as the key to renewing Polish politics, at around 15-20%.

Civic Platform also faces another potential electoral threat with the formation at the end of May of a new liberal grouping, ‘ModernPL’ (NowoczesnaPL). ModernPL – led by economist Ryszard Petru, an associate of Leszek Balcerowicz, the architect of Poland’s 1990s transition to a capitalist market economy – is appealing to the kind of younger, well-educated urban voters and entrepreneurs, attracted by the economically liberal policies once associated with Civic Platform. The ruling party has alienated many of these voters who feel that it has drifted away from its free market roots, exemplified the government’s reluctance to reduce taxes and scrap pension privileges for various sectoral groups, and it’s dismantling of the obligatory OFE private pension fund scheme. Mr Petru lacks Mr Kukiz’s charisma and ModernPL’s social base is too narrow for it to attract widespread support; most polls show the new grouping hovering around the 5% threshold required for parties to secure parliamentary representation. Nonetheless, along with Mr Kukiz’s movement it could still peel away some support from what should be Civic Platform’s natural electoral base.

The ‘tape affair’ returns

Even worse, no sooner had the ruling party started to recover its composure after the presidential election defeat than the government found itself dogged by allegations of corruption and sleaze when controversial businessman and anti-establishment activist Zbigniew Stonoga published thousands of pages of classified documents on the Internet from the ongoing public prosecutor’s investigation into the so-called ‘tape affair’. This scandal, the most serious to hit the Civic Platform-led government since it came to power in 2007, erupted a year ago when the weekly news magazine ‘Wprost’ published secret tape recordings of private meetings involving senior government ministers and other prominent public figures in high-end Warsaw restaurants. Although they did not appear to reveal any illegal actions, the transcripts prompted a criminal investigation by Poland’s prosecutor general to identify their source, and drew popular anger at the crude language used by public figures while discussing state matters over expensive meals paid for by the taxpayer. In retrospect, Civic Platform was lulled into a false sense of security following the unexpected election last autumn of the then prime minister and party leader Donald Tusk as EU Council President which, together with Mrs Kopacz’s appointment as his successor, appeared to wipe out the damage to the ruling party inflicted by the scandal.

Although the latest set of leaks did not appear to contain anything substantially new or damaging for the government, the re-appearance of the scandal put Civic Platform back on the defensive. Fearing the prospect of further embarrassing revelations in the months leading up to the election, in an extraordinary political purge Mrs Kopacz forced the resignations of the treasury, health and sports ministers together with three deputy ministers and other senior officials including Radosław Sikorski the speaker of the Sejm, the more powerful lower house of the Polish parliament – her chief policy adviser, and the co-ordinator of the state security services. Most of those sacked had featured in the tapes, although Mrs Kopacz also appeared to use the leak as a pretext to get rid of some unpopular officials who were not connected to the scandal, such as health minister Bartosz Arłukowicz. As replacements she nominated famous cardio-surgeon and Civic Platform regional councillor Professor Marian Zembala as health minister, world champion and Olympic gold medallist rower Adam Korol as sports minister, and Andrzej Czerwiński, a second-rank Civic Platform politician, as treasury minister.

However, the re-shuffle was poorly handled, with a five day gap between the announcement of the resignations and new appointments, and came across as a panic move forced by the leaks to stem the government’s falling popularity rather than a genuine desire to atone for the ‘tape affair’. It was followed quickly by a Civic Platform programmatic convention which was promised as a ’turning point’ in the ruling party’s fortunes but proved to be a damp squib. No new major policies were announced and Mrs Kopacz simply unveiled a special team that would draw up a new programme to be published in September, shortly ahead of the election.

Mrs Szydło steals the show

Moreover, Civic Platform’s rather anaemic convention was over-shadowed by Law and Justice’s decision to hold a rival event on the same day and then steal the ruling party’s thunder by announcing that its emollient deputy leader Beata Szydło, who was Mr Duda’s election campaign manager, and not Mr Kaczyński would be the party’s prime ministerial nominee in the parliamentary poll. Civic Platform strategists were banking on the fact that with Mr Kaczyński as the focus its negative campaigning would be more effective than it was during the presidential campaign when the Law and Justice leader kept a low profile. Mr Kaczyński has an extremely dedicated following among the party’s core supporters but is a polarising figure and one of the country’s least trusted politicians among more moderate voters.

For sure, Mrs Szydło is untested in such a high profile role. Civic Platform strategists have also tried to claim that she is just an acceptable front to make Law and Justice more palatable and will be steered by Mr Kaczyński from behind-the-scenes. Moreover, having a prime minister who is not party leader may also cause serious problems in the longer term. Indeed, Law and Justice’s opponents have suggested that Mrs Szydło might just be a temporary stand-in and drew analogies with the situation after the party’s first election victory in 2005 when Mr Kaczyński, whose twin brother Lech was elected President at the same time, appointed second-rank politician Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz as prime minister to avoid the controversy of twins filling Poland’s two highest state offices, only for Mr Kaczyński to replace him a few months later. However, Mrs Szydło’s appointment has given Law and Justice a valuable short-term boost and there is every chance it can carry this momentum through to polling day, leaving difficult questions about the long-term sustainability of the arrangement until after the election.

Is Mrs Kopacz up to it?

Civic Platform has clearly undergone a serious political crisis. Hostility towards the political establishment has been a noticeable feature of Polish politics in recent months and is being directed almost exclusively at the ruling party, whom much of the electorate, especially younger voters, see as representing an out-of-touch elite. As the presidential election showed, voters are now much more cynical about Civic Platform’s moves to win back lost support, which they often perceive as panicky and inauthentic. Moreover, large sections of the ruling party are now too inwardly focused on sharing out the spoils of office and used to the idea that Civic Platform can win elections by simply tapping into the ‘politics of fear’.

There are also serious question marks over whether Mrs Kopacz has the leadership skills to turn the party’s fortunes around. The evidence so far suggests that she has proved to be a reasonably efficient party manager and political tactician, skilled at balancing various factions and controlling the political situation through effective short-term manoeuvring. However, Mr Kopacz lacks gravitas and charisma, and, most importantly, it is unclear if she has the capacity for strategic political thinking that can help Civic Platform to develop an effective response to the changes in societal attitudes that have eroded support for the ruling party in recent months.

Nonetheless, however uncomfortable Civic Platform members may feel about her leadership, and in spite of the fact that faith in her ability to win the election has diminished radically over the last few months, there is little appetite within the party for a leadership challenge with a broad consensus that such a contest will only de-stabilise and weaken it further. Moreover, none of Mrs Kopacz’s potential challengers, such as foreign minister Grzegorz Schetyna, are particularly keen to take over when the party is in such a precarious state and would prefer to see her take responsibility for an electoral defeat that appears increasingly likely. Nonetheless, while Mrs Kopacz has managed to neutralise potential challenges to her authority in the short-term, these will re-emerge very quickly if Civic Platform loses the election, and possibly even lead to the party’s eventual implosion.

Down but not out?

It is still too early to write Civic Platform off. Although the party is severely weakened, it retains considerable assets, including the backing of most of the cultural and media establishment. In spite of its slump in the polls, there has not, as yet, been a total meltdown in the party’s support below the 20% threshold which keeps it in the electoral game. Civic Platform has both the capacity to develop a more effective counter-attack and access to the instruments of government which provide it with opportunities to ‘make the political weather’. However, as things currently stand, it is Law and Justice that has the momentum and, unless Mr Kaczyński’s grouping becomes complacent and starts to make major unforced errors, the ruling party will need to come up with a much more convincing response if it is to regain the political initiative.