The Polish Politics Blog

Analysis of the contemporary Polish political scene

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How will mayor Paweł Adamowicz’s killing affect Polish politics?

The brutal, high-profile killing of the opposition-linked mayor of one of Poland’s largest and most politically important cities produced fiercely contested interpretations of its meaning and significance. But experience suggests that ‘martyrdom politics’ is not an effective political strategy and, although the tragedy was an extremely traumatic one for Polish society, it will probably be subsumed within existing divisions rather than representing a game changer.

A hate-fuelled ‘political murder’?

In January, Paweł Adamowicz, an opposition-affiliated politician who was mayor of the northern Polish coastal city of Gdańsk since 1998, died after being fatally stabbed while taking part in the local finale of the so-called Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity (WOŚP), Poland’s largest annual charity drive organised outside of the Catholic Church. Such an unprecedented and high profile killing involving a prominent, well-known local politician was clearly an extremely traumatic experience for Polish society. However, it is not clear how, and to what extent, the tragedy will impact upon the country’s political scene, in a year which sees European Parliament (EP) elections in May and a crucial parliamentary poll in the autumn. This will depend, in part, on which of the fiercely contested interpretations of the meaning and significance of the tragic Gdańsk events becomes accepted as the dominant public narrative.

Opposition politicians and anti-government commentators have tried to link the killing to the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) grouping, Poland’s ruling party since autumn 2015, arguing that it was a ‘political murder’. They pointed to the fact that, immediately after stabbing the mayor, the culprit, identified in the media as ‘Stefan W.’, seized the microphone and claimed that he had been wrongly imprisoned and tortured by Civic Platform (PO), Poland’s liberal-centrist ruling party between 2007-15 and currently the main opposition grouping. Mr Adamowicz was previously a member of Civic Platform since it was founded in 2001, although his membership was suspended in 2015 and he stood as an independent candidate in last autumn’s local elections.

Comparing the Gdańsk tragedy to the 1922 assassination by a fanatic of the then-Polish President Gabriel Narutowicz, who had earlier been fiercely criticised by the nationalist right, the government’s opponents argued that Mr Adamowicz’s killing could not be blamed solely on the attacker and that the mayor’s death was linked to his political beliefs. They held Law and Justice responsible for creating what they argued was an increasingly toxic social and political climate by feeding the presence of, and normalising, ‘hate speech’. The ruling party did this, they claimed, both through their rhetoric and the alleged weak response of state institutions to manifestations of such hatred directed against opposition politicians.

They pointed to the fact that Mr Adamowicz’s high profile criticisms of the government’s opposition to Poland accepting EU quotas of Muslim migrants, and increasingly vocal liberal stance on issues such as the rights of sexual minorities, meant that he was regularly subjected to personal abuse from government supporters and radical political groupings. For example, two years ago in a publicity stunt the radical nationalist All-Poland Youth (MW) grouping published a series of fake ‘political death certificates’ for a number of local politicians, including Mr Adamowicz, putting the cause of death as ‘liberalism, multiculturalism and stupidity’.

In particular, the government’s critics said that the barrage of criticism to which Mr Adamowicz had been subjected prior to his killing by Law and Justice’s media allies – especially Polish public TV news which, they argued, had been turned into an instrument of brutal pro-government propaganda – legitimised violence and made attacks on him more likely. Such harsh criticisms, they argued, created a fertile ground for individuals who may not have been directly associated with Law and Justice and more radical political groupings but were motivated by their rhetoric and felt attracted to committing such crimes; making Mr Adamowicz’s murder ‘political’ in the broader sense.

No evidence of political motivations?

The government’s supporters, on the other hand, accused the opposition and its media allies of trying to cynically exploit, and create a political myth surrounding, Mr Adamowicz and his tragic death by engaging in ‘martyrdom politics’. They argued that the opposition deliberately used the ambiguous term ‘political murder’ to create a moral panic by conflating the killing of a politician with a murder that was overtly politically or ideologically motivated. Pro-government commentators said that there was no clear evidence that the perpetrator was in any way linked to, or involved with, Law and Justice, nor that the ‘political climate’ led to such extreme behaviour. They pointed out that Stefan W. was a career criminal with a reported history of severe mental health problems who had recently been released from prison after serving a five-and-a-half year sentence for a series of violent armed bank robberies. They suggested that it was likely that Stefan W. felt that Civic Platform was to blame for imprisoning him because it was in government when he was convicted in 2014, and thus saw Mr Adamowicz as a symbol of the state authorities at that time.

Law and Justice acknowledged that there needed to be greater mutual respect among political adversaries and that the language of public debate should be toned down. However, they insisted that political divisions were not the cause of the Gdańsk tragedy, and argued that opposition parties and their media allies had also used inflammatory rhetoric against Law and Justice. They pointed out that, although Civic Platform was trying to present Mr Adamowicz as a political martyr, the party also distanced itself from him due to alleged irregularities in the Gdańsk mayor’s financial statements. Indeed, it was during the previous Civic Platform-led government’s term of office that the public prosecutor levelled tax fraud charges against him. Civic Platform, they noted, stood its own candidate against Mr Adamowicz in last autumn’s local elections and only supported him in the second round run-off against Law and Justice.

Government supporters also claimed that the ‘hate speech’ narrative was invented by liberal elites and being used instrumentally by Law and Justice’s opponents as a political weapon to morally and politically discredit the ruling party and its (as they saw it) legitimate (if sometimes harsh) criticisms of the Poland’s post-communist establishment. Criminalising ‘hate speech’ in other countries, they argued, resulted in attempts to censor and eliminate from public life defenders of national identity and culture, and supporters of traditional social values. Rather, the broader lessons that needed to be drawn from the tragedy were, they said, about lax security arrangements at public events and changing the penal code to ensure that those found guilty of the most serious crimes faced harsher sentences, and dangerous offenders with psychiatric problems did not slip through the net.

Complicating Law and Justice’s ‘de-mobilisation’ strategy

Knowing that (whatever Poles’ evaluations of him as a politician) the human tragedy of Mr Adamowicz’s killing has evoked a great deal of natural sympathy for him, the liberal-centrist opposition is likely to return to this topic in political debates running up to this year’s elections. Its strategy will be to try and draw upon the Gdańsk mayor’s legacy by presenting him as a symbolic political martyr of the struggle against the Law and Justice government. It will thereby cast the political choice facing Poles in the forthcoming elections in moral terms; presenting Law and Justice as a pariah party responsible for what they argue was the toxic atmosphere that led to Mr Adamowicz’s ‘political murder’.

At the same time, whether one believes the ruling party’s motives were instrumental or genuine, in the wake of the tragedy Law and Justice tried to present itself as the party of conciliation in apparent contrast to the opposition whom it accused of escalating tensions by pursuing ‘revenge politics’. For sure, party leader Jarosław Kaczyński was heavily criticised for missing the minute’s silence for Mr Adamowicz in parliament (some commentators argue that this was because he was concerned that Civic Platform leader Grzegorz Schetyna would use a preceding eulogy speech to accuse the ruling party of political responsibility for the killing; Mr Kaczyński says he was simply delayed) and the mayor’s funeral. The government’s opponents also accuse Law and Justice of hypocrisy arguing that it tried to politicise the October 2010 killing of one of its party workers, Marek Rosiak; although Law and Justice supporters respond that the killer’s motivations in this case were much more clearly political: upon his arrest the perpetrator said that he had also wanted to kill Mr Kaczyński.

Nonetheless, Law and Justice’s response to the Gdańsk tragedy dovetailed with its broader strategy of trying to lower the emotional temperature of political debate and downplay more controversial issues ahead of the elections in order to de-mobilise its opponents, especially in the larger towns and cities. However, Mr Adamowicz’s killing complicates the ruling party’s plans as it will be very difficult for Law and Justice to maintain its moderate, unifying tone when the opposition accuses it of being politically responsible for the ‘hate’ that led to the Gdańsk mayor’s death. If Law and Justice does not offer a counter-narrative to this then it will appear to be passively accepting the opposition’s arguments. On the other hand, if it does respond in kind then Law and Justice will find itself on the defensive rather than promoting its own positive policy agenda. Moreover, such a response also risks undermining the party’s broader ‘de-mobilisation’ strategy by prompting a further escalation of emotions and potentially greater polarisation of the political scene.

‘Martyrdom politics’ is not an effective strategy

On the face of it, the unprecedented, brutal killing of an incumbent mayor of one of Poland’s largest and most politically important cities should have a major impact on the country’s political scene, and some opinion polls carried out in recent weeks do show a small dip in support for Law and Justice. However, this may well be due to other factors, there is no clear trend, and Civic Platform does not appear be the beneficiary. For sure, the effect of such dramatic events in re-shaping public opinion can sometimes be delayed. However, experience suggests that, while may they remain part of the broader public debate, even traumatic and emotional occurrences such as Mr Adamowicz’s death – which, at the time, appear to have the capacity to be political turning points – gradually decline in salience as the news cycle moves on relentlessly and Poles turn their attention to other issues. For example, the April 2010 Smolensk tragedy – a plane crash in which the then Law and Justice-backed Polish President Lech Kaczyński, Jarosław’s twin brother, and 95 others were killed, and which Mr Kaczyński’s party tried to blame on the incumbent Civic Platform-led government (and Russia) – did not benefit it in electoral terms (nor, indeed, did Mr Rosiak’s killing).

The experience of the Smolensk tragedy, therefore, suggests that – other than consolidating and building strong emotional links between Law and Justice and its core supporters for whom, at one point, it became almost a touchstone issue – ‘martyrdom politics’ is not an effective political strategy. Indeed, it can actually prove a distraction from the more prosaic and painstaking, but ultimately electorally rewarding, task of developing popular and credible programmatic alternatives. So rather than representing a political game changer with the capacity to influence the outcome of this year’s elections and re-set the political scene, Mr Adamowicz’s killing is more likely to be subsumed within existing political divisions and debates between Law and Justice and its opponents. Most Poles will, therefore, probably simply accept the narrative of the political current with whom they already identify most strongly as to what the Gdańsk tragedy represents: a hate-filled ‘political murder’ or the actions of a mentally-ill, violent convict with no broader political context.

 

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Is Robert Biedroń the Polish left’s saviour?

Poland’s most popular and charismatic left-wing politician’s new initiative has a good chance of achieving short-term success in this year’s elections. But the grouping faces sharp criticism that it is dividing the opposition and playing into the right-wing government’s hands, and its longer-term prospects are much more questionable.

‘Newness’ and authenticity

The Polish left is in deep crisis. For most of the post-1989 period the most powerful political and electoral force on the left was the communist successor Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), which governed the country from 1993-97 and 2001-5. The Alliance has been in the doldrums since its support collapsed at the 2005 parliamentary election following a series of spectacular high level corruption scandals, and it contested the most recent October 2015 poll – won decisively by the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party as part of the ‘United Left’ (ZL) electoral coalition in alliance with the ‘Your Movement’ (TR) grouping. The latter was an anti-clerical social liberal party led by controversial businessman Janusz Palikot which came from nowhere to finish third with just over 10% of the votes in the 2011 election but failed to capitalise on its success. However, in 2015, winning 3.6% of the votes, the new radical left ‘Together’ (Razem) party peeled away enough support to prevent the ‘United Left’ from crossing the 8% threshold for electoral alliances to secure parliamentary representation (it is 5% for individual parties). This meant that, for the first time since 1989, there were no left-wing parties represented in the Sejm, the more powerful lower chamber of the Polish parliament.

Robert Biedroń is by far the most popular and charismatic left-wing politician in Poland today. In 2011, he was elected as a ‘Your Movement’ parliamentary deputy but, seeing that the party was in a downward spiral, sought an escape hatch and in 2014 became mayor of Słupsk, a provincial city the northern Pomeranian region. Another weak performance by left-wing parties in last autumn’s local elections – the Democratic Left Alliance secured 7% and 11 seats (out of 552) in elections to Poland’s 16 regional authorities, the best indicator of national party support, while ‘Together’ only won 1.6% of the vote – created an opening for Mr Biedroń, who decided not to stand for re-election as Słupsk mayor in order to launch a new political initiative in 2019.

Mr Biedroń should not be under-estimated. He has many assets including excellent political antennae and communication skills. Mr Biedroń used his Słupsk mayoralty to project himself as a hard-working, effective and popular common-sense manager and leader, boasting a set of positive achievements during his term of office. He has also worked hard to develop an image of authenticity and ‘newness’. Although Mr Biedroń has been on the political scene as a left-wing activist for many of years – originally building his reputation and national political profile in the early 2000s as founder of the Polish Campaign Against Homophobia (KPH) – he has never participated in national government. Indeed, given his own small-town background, a key element of his political appeal has been to portray himself as an anti-establishment ‘outsider’ trying to open up a sclerotic Polish political system. Although many Poles are culturally conservative, the fact that Mr Biedroń is in a same-sex relationship and has a clear social liberal-left ideological profile does not appear to have put off significant numbers of potential voters, because he has the rare political quality of being able to communicate with, and engender sympathy among, very diverse groups of voters and portray himself as a consensus-builder.

Transcending the ‘old’ politics?

Mr Biedroń, who will launch his new political initiative in February, claims that he can win over voters who are disillusioned with Law and Justice but would not otherwise support the opposition. His broad programmatic appeal is based on the ideas of what some commentators call the ‘symmetrists’ (symetryści), who accuse the liberal-centrist Civic Platform (PO), Poland’s governing party between 2007-14 and currently the main opposition grouping, of simply wanting a return to the status quo ante, and ignoring the fact that previous governments were also guilty of many of the pathologies which are ascribed to Law and Justice. The symmetrists argue that it is both morally right and strategically sensible to develop some equidistance between these two political camps. So, while pledging to roll back the government’s reforms of state institutions such as the judiciary – which, its opponents, argue have undermined the rule of law and civic freedoms (a claim the government vehemently denies) – Mr Biedroń accuses the liberal-centrist opposition of failing to properly acknowledge that Law and Justice’s popular social spending policies have improved the living standards of, and restored a sense of dignity to, many ordinary Poles.

His programme, which is being drawn up by a group of relatively unknown expert advisers, is likely to include policies such as: removing state support for the Catholic Church and reducing its role in public institutions; greater environmental regulation; and increased spending on public services, especially education and health. However, rather than building his new movement around an existing programmatic agenda, over the last few months Mr Biedroń has organised a series of local meetings – many in smaller, provincial towns – where he claimed that he was ‘writing a programme with the people’. This is obviously somewhat artificial but these ‘brainstorms’, at which Mr Biedroń skilfully acted as master of ceremonies, did appear to create a genuine sense of interest and grassroots participation. In doing so, Mr Biedroń tried to portray himself as someone who transcends ‘old’ party politics; and, interestingly, consistently avoids the terms ‘left-wing’ and ‘liberal’, preferring to define himself as a ‘progressive’ (some commentators have dubbed him the ‘Polish Marcon’).

Mr Biedroń’s critics argue that both he and his political project have major weaknesses. They accuse him of being too much of a ‘political celebrity’ more interested in building up his national media profile than serious politics. They point to the fact during his first three years as Słupsk mayor he spent seven months on business trips, and claim that, in spite of his popularity and skilful public relations, he did not actually solve any of the town’s fundamental problems. They also argue that while Mr Biedroń often comes across as friendly and sympathetic, in order to make a national political breakthrough he will have to transcend a purely personal and emotional appeal and convince Poles that he can actually take responsibility for the running of the state. This will involve him developing clearer positions on issues that he has either avoided completely or where his programmatic statements have, to date, been rather vague: such as economic policy and foreign affairs.

Perhaps most fundamentally, Mr Biedroń faces the problem that in Poland the less well-off, economically leftist electorate tends to be older and more socially conservative, so often inclines towards parties such as Law and Justice that are right-wing on moral-cultural issues but also support high levels of social welfare and greater state intervention in the economy. Although Mr Biedroń is quite subtle in the way that he articulates his social liberalism, using the discourse of diversity and inclusion, it will still be a challenge for him to win over poorer, economically leftist but culturally traditionalist voters. At the same time, the (relatively narrow) base of younger, better-off, socially liberal urban voters, who in Western Europe would incline naturally towards left-wing parties, in Poland are often quite economically liberal as well. Mr Biedroń may alienate them if he tries too hard to outbid Law and Justice’s social spending promises in order to win over less well-off voters.

‘Adding value’ or fragmenting the opposition?

Early opinion polls suggest that potential support for Mr Biedroń’s grouping is solid if not spectacular: around the 5-10% mark that many such new political initiatives enjoy when they are launched. However, to play a pivotal role in the next parliament his grouping will need to secure around the 10-15% support that polls suggest Mr Biedroń could pick up as a candidate in a presidential election. Indeed, given that highly personalised elections have helped charismatic individuals build up new political movements in the past, a presidential poll would have been the best launch pad for his new grouping. However, the next presidential election is not scheduled until summer 2020.

Nonetheless, the May European Parliament (EP) election could also work well as a testing ground for his new movement. EP elections involve low start-up costs, because parties do not have to find many candidates, and the pattern of turnout – extremely low overall, but higher in urban areas – means that a liberal-left grouping can cross the 5% representation threshold by mobilising a relatively small number of voters around a distinctive appeal or well-known individual. The timing of these elections also allows Mr Biedroń to keep his options open and, depending on his grouping’s result, either contest the more important autumn parliamentary election independently or as part of a broader anti-Law and Justice electoral alliance.

Indeed, considerations of Mr Biedroń’s prospects map on to broader debates about whether or not the opposition should contest the next elections as a single bloc. Mr Biedroń’s supporters claim that his new grouping will ‘add value’ by attracting support from those voters who would not otherwise back the liberal-centrist opposition. However, his critics say that the anti-Law and Justice parties are involved in a zero-sum game and that Mr Biedroń’s new grouping would simply further fragment the opposition. A September 2018 poll by the IBRiS agency for the ‘Rzeczpospolita’ newspaper found that Mr Biedroń’s new party was most likely to pick up support from the existing opposition groupings, with 61% of his supporters coming from Civic Platform, and only 10% from previous non-voters. Mr Biedroń’s critics draw attention to the fact that the Polish electoral system, proportion representation in multi-member districts using the so-called d’Hondt counting method, favours larger groupings and that a broad anti-Law and Justice electoral alliance would secure a ‘premium for unity’, attracting more support overall than several parties standing independently. What these arguments do not really account for is how the political dynamics and dominant narratives might change if an effective ‘third force’ challenger were to emerge on the Polish political scene.

Playing a longer game

Mr Biedroń’s prospects are one of the great unknowns of Polish politics in the country’s year of elections. It is relatively easy to launch a new political grouping around a well-known personality that is electorally successful in the short-term, and Mr Biedroń would not be first Polish politician to benefit from the effect of such ‘newness’. A respectable result of around 5-10% in the EP elections would not be a great surprise and his grouping certainly has the potential to secure parliamentary representation. However, many such groupings have also failed to live up to their early promise, and quickly lost support once the initial enthusiasm subsides.

In fact, Mr Biedroń is playing a much longer political game in which this year’s elections are simply a staging post. Indeed, in some ways it is actually in the longer-term interests of his political project if Law and Justice were to remain in office as this would create an opening for Mr Biedroń’s new grouping to emerge as the main opposition party; although he would obviously never admit this. But a sharp polarisation between the two large electoral blocs will strengthen the argument that the opposition needs to unite under the leadership of Civic Platform as the largest party and make it extremely difficult for Mr Biedroń’s new initiative to cut through with a distinctive message. Indeed, in those circumstances Mr Biedroń could come under increasing attack from the liberal-left media and cultural elites, which should be his natural allies, if they start to feel that he is playing into Law and Justice’s hands by dividing the opposition.

Will Poland’s Law and Justice party win this year’s elections?

The right-wing ruling party’s strategy is based on claiming to offer socio-economic stability and prosperity while downplaying controversial issues to avoid mobilising its opponents. It has been on the defensive for most of last year but remains ahead in the polls and more credible than the liberal-centrist opposition on issues that Poles care most about.

On the defensive

The coming year will be a crucial one for Polish politics as the autumn parliamentary election could be the most important and consequential since the collapse of communism in 1989. Having set the political agenda for the previous three years, the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) grouping, Poland’s governing party since autumn 2015, found itself on the defensive throughout much of 2018. The year began with a sweeping government re-shuffle by Mariusz Morawiecki, a respected former banker who replaced incumbent Beata Szydło as prime minister at the end of 2017, having earlier served as her finance minister. Law and Justice was hoping to re-focus the government’s priorities on to economic development and improving its international standing, particularly within the EU. The ruling party hoped that, having carried out difficult and controversial reforms during the first half of the parliament, a pivot to the technocratic political centre would win over moderate voters.

However, almost immediately the government found itself on the back foot as a result of an accumulation of political controversies. Firstly, it faced a major crisis of international relations with Israel – and, as a consequence, the USA, the administration’s key foreign policy ally. This was prompted by the passage of a controversial anti-defamation law which made it a criminal offence to falsely ascribe responsibility to the Polish nation or state for the crimes committed by Nazi Germany. Israeli critics argued this could lead to the punishment of Holocaust survivors for their public testimony against Poles who harmed Jews during the German occupation, and the crisis was only defused when Law and Justice agreed to amend the law.

This was followed by controversy over the generous bonuses paid to Mrs Szydło and other ministers which exposed the government to criticism that it was failing to live up to its claimed higher ethical standards; and once again Law and Justice was forced to climb down as ministers donated their bonuses to charity. The government also failed to close down its ongoing dispute with the European Commission over its controversial judicial reform programme. Brussels felt that the government’s concessions on this issue did not address its main concerns and continued with its action against Poland under Article 7 of the European treaties, which it can invoke against any EU member state where it feels there is a ‘systemic threat’ to democracy, as well as referring some of the reforms to the European Court of Justice.

In the October/November local elections, Law and Justice’s hopes that its pivot to the centre would expand its support base in urban areas, and programme of large-scale social transfers mobilise swathes of (previously electorally passive) beneficiaries, failed to materialise. Although the ruling party won the highest share of the vote in elections to Poland’s 16 regional authorities, the best indicator of national party support, it performed poorly in medium-sized and larger towns, partly as a result of a much higher than usual turnout among the government’s opponents in these areas.

A threat to Law and Justice’s ethical legitimation

In November, Law and Justice once again found itself on the defensive following media reports of a recording which appeared to show that the head of Poland’s financial supervisory commission (KNF) Marek Chrzanowski was involved in a 40 million złoties bribery solicitation from the owner of Getin Noble Bank Leszek Czarnecki; an allegation which Mr Chrzanowski vehemently denied. The scandal posed huge risks for Law and Justice because the party has made reforming state institutions to raise moral standards a core element of its ethical legitimation and political appeal. Law and Justice’s 2015 electoral success was based in large part on promising clean and honest government and portraying itself, in apparent contrast to its predecessor – led by the liberal-centrist Civic Platform (PO) party, currently the main opposition grouping – as representing the interests and values of ordinary Poles rather than venal and self-serving political and business elites. Consequently, Law and Justice moved quickly to force Mr Chrzanowski to step down and order state agencies to investigate the allegations.

The opposition argued that the investigator’s delayed response allowed Mr Chrzanowski to clear his office, and called for a special parliamentary commission to investigate the scandal. Moreover, although Law and Justice was at pains to point out that Mr Chrzanowski, a former central banker, was not a political figure, he was nominated to his post in 2016 by Mrs Szydło at the recommendation of Adam Glapiński, the head of the of the National Bank of Poland (NBP) and long-time political ally of Law and Justice leader Jarosław Kaczyński.

Up until now, the scandal has not developed sufficient momentum to really damage the government and Law and Justice is hoping that it will fade with the passage of time. However, experience suggests that the impact of high profile scandals such as these can often be delayed, gradually chipping away at the governing party’s credibility until a further (sometimes relatively minor) incident or revelation acts as a tipping point and shifts the public mood very quickly. In this case, it could be the emergence of new recordings damaging to the government.

Finally, at the end of the year the government was embroiled in concerns as to how it intended to protect households, firms and local authorities from surging electricity price increases being proposed by state-run power vendors. In the event, it avoided the crisis by pushing through emergency legislation giving tax relief to electricity consumers and providing compensation for utilities, which it promised would guarantee that prices would remain unchanged in 2019.

Winding down conflicts

Law and Justice’s strategy for regaining the political initiative is based on trying to persuade moderate voters to focus on the government’s achievements in delivering on its highly popular social spending promises while maintaining economic growth and fiscal stability. The party’s approach is aimed at winning over undecided and passive non-voters who are not particularly interested in politics by offering them socio-economic stability and prosperity, and re-assuring them that politics will be quieter and less turbulent moving forward. It appears to be learning from its mistakes and getting better at portraying Poland as a stable and secure country under its leadership. Although Law and Justice’s support has fallen back recently, it continues to enjoy an average of around 40% in opinion polls, ten percentage points ahead of Civic Platform, and remains on course to emerge as the largest party after the parliamentary election, although whether it will be able to continue to govern without coalition partners is much more uncertain.

At the same time, drawing lessons from the local elections the ruling party is trying to lower the temperature of the political debate and downplay more controversial issues in order to avoid mobilising the anti-Law and Justice electorate. This has included trying to defuse the party’s row with the EU institutions by withdrawing some of the most contested elements of its judicial reform programme in order to neutralise the opposition’s apparently effective – and, from Law and Justice’s perspective, extremely dangerous – claim that the party wants to take Poland out of the Union (so-called ‘Polexit’). It also involves distancing the party from attempts by Catholic-inspired civic organisations to further tighten Poland’s already restrictive abortion law, an issue that is felt to mobilise anti-Law and Justice voters in urban areas. The nightmare haunting Law and Justice is that the next election becomes a repeat of the 2007 snap poll when, as the incumbent, it mobilised its core supporters and even increased its share of the vote on the back of a strong economic performance, but ultimately lost because larger numbers turned out to vote for Civic Platform which promised a calmer and more stable political environment.

Moreover, the political formula that worked so well for Law and Justice in 2015 – when it won support from voters not altogether convinced by its radical critique of the functioning of the post-1989 Polish state but disillusioned with the former governing elites and attracted by the party’s social policies which held out the promise that they could share more fully in the country’s economic successis slowly becoming exhausted. It will be difficult for Law and Justice to match the high profile spending pledges that were the key to its election victories; although it is apparently planning a series of new policy initiatives focusing on tax cuts in the New Year. Moreover, even when Law and Justice is appealing on bread-and-butter issues the nature of the party is such that it needs to locate its socio-economic policies within a broader political project, which makes it difficult to portray a purely technocratic-centrist image.

At the same time, the governing camp is not always consistent in pursuing its strategy of winding down conflicts, with many commentators citing justice minister Zbigniew Ziobro, who is on bad terms with Mr Morawiecki, as the worst offender. They argue that Mr Ziobro ignited the ‘Polexit’ debate by asking the constitutional tribunal whether Polish judges had the right to refer queries on EU law to the European Court of Justice, which the opposition interpreted as a possible pretext for Poland to ignore the Court’s verdict. The justice ministry also shifted public attention back on to the financial regulation scandal by arresting former heads of the supervisory body for alleged negligence in their oversight of the SKOK Wołomin credit and savings union, which went bankrupt in 2014. Critics argued this was a ham-fisted attempt to distract from Mr Chrzanowski’s arrest. But Mr Ziobro is difficult to sack because he leads the ‘Solidaristic Poland’ (SP) party, a small grouping but one which, if it stood independently from Law and Justice, could deprive the ruling party of victory. An even greater threat would be if he joined up with a potential new right-wing challenger party that could emerge from the milieu linked to the Catholic broadcaster Radio Maryja, which is very influential among Poland’s ‘religious right’ electorate.

Still more credible on issues Poles care about?

Finally, Law and Justice’s electoral prospects also depend upon whether the liberal-centrist opposition can mount an effective challenge. For sure, it retains considerable cultural, financial and media assets, and enjoys close links with the EU political establishment. It is also helped by the fact that the European Parliament (EP) election, where turnout is very low but higher in the urban areas that the opposition enjoys stronger support in, will be held in May. A good performance here could provide it with valuable momentum in the run-up to the autumn parliamentary election; one of the reasons why Law and Justice is considering bringing the latter forward to the spring.

However, the opposition lacks convincing leadership around whom the government’s opponents can unite and rally around. Civic Platform leader Grzegorz Schetyna is an effective political operator who has emerged as the undisputed leader of the opposition, but lacks dynamism and charisma, and his ruthlessness has made leaders of smaller opposition groupings wary of working too closely with his ‘Civic Coalition’ (KO) electoral alliance. Moreover, the opposition still lacks an attractive programmatic appeal on socio-economic issues. Mr Schetyna’s strategy, of hoping that Poles will simply rally around whoever happens to be the main alternative to the incumbent, worked reasonably well in urban areas during the local elections but a more positive approach will be needed to win a national poll. Although Poles will not vote for Law and Justice out of gratitude, the fact that the ruling party has fulfilled the majority of its social spending promises gives it much greater credibility than the opposition on these issues that voters appear to care most about.

 

How will the ‘Polexit’ issue play out in Polish politics?

The liberal-centrist opposition’s claim that Poland’s right-wing government wants to take the country out of the EU is potentially extremely dangerous for the ruling party. To neutralise the opposition’s apparently effective narrative, it is trying to defuse its row with the EU institutions while leaving the core of its contested judicial reforms intact.

Stand-off with the Commission

Last month, the government – which, since autumn 2015, has been led by the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party – rushed through amendments reversing its earlier law lowering the retirement age for supreme court judges from 70 to 65. The original law required two dozen judges, including the court’s first president Małgorzata Gersdorf, to take early retirement before their terms of office expired, except for those re-instated by party-backed President Andrzej Duda. The amendments were a response to the European Court of Justice’s October preliminary injunction which called for the contested reforms to be suspended and the retired judges to be re-instated pending a final ruling. The injunction came after the European Commission launched a legal action against Poland, arguing that the early retirement provisions violated EU law.  Law and Justice officials had earlier given conflicting signals as to whether they would abide by it.

The government’s concessions were the most significant to date in its protracted stand-off with the Commission which has been ongoing since January 2016. Initially, the dispute was over the membership and functioning of Poland’s constitutional tribunal but last year escalated to include Law and Justice’s fiercely contested judicial reform programme. In addition to the Court of Justice case, the Commission has also taken the unprecedented step of initiating an action against Poland under Article 7 of the European treaties which it can invoke against any EU member state where it feels there is a ‘systemic threat’ to democracy and the rule; threatening Warsaw with sanctions including the suspension of its European Council voting rights. In doing so, it agreed with criticisms levelled by Poland’s legal establishment and most opposition parties – led by the liberal-centrist Civic Platform (PO), the country’s governing party between 2007-15 – that the reforms undermined judicial independence and threatened the key democratic principle of separation of powers. The government’s opponents argued that by putting appointments under political control these reforms allowed the ruling party to pack the courts and judicial supervisory bodies with its own, hand-picked nominees.

The government’s supporters, on the other hand, argued that the reforms were needed because Polish courts were deeply inefficient and tolerated frequent irregularities. Law and Justice believes that, following the country’s flawed transition to democracy in 1989, the judiciary, like many key Polish institutions, was expropriated by an extremely well-entrenched, and often deeply corrupt, post-communist elite, which then co-opted a new legal establishment that perpetuated its legacy. It accused the Commission of bias and double standards, arguing that the reforms were in line with practices that existed in other established Western democracies. The Commission was, they argued, motivated by the fact that Warsaw has been robust in promoting Polish interests and values, and opposing the socially liberal and multi-cultural policies supported by the EU political establishment, such as the Union’s compulsory migrant relocation scheme.

The Court judgement changes the political calculation

Up until now Law and Justice was prepared to face down the Commission, calculating that, even if many Poles had misgivings about its specific reforms, they strongly supported overhauling the judiciary and were wary about EU institutions becoming involved in the country’s domestic affairs. However, the European Court’s ruling changed this political calculation. Under the Article 7 procedure the pressure on Poland is solely political because sanctions require unanimity in the Council of Ministers and several member states, notably Hungary, have indicated that they will vote against. The Court, on the other hand, can impose heavy financial penalties on countries that do not comply with its rulings, which would unsettle the many Poles whose support for their country’s EU membership is driven increasingly by the tangible material benefits that it is felt to offer.

Non-compliance with the European Court’s ruling would also involve an open breach of the EU’s rules allowing the opposition to associate Law and Justice with so-called ‘Polexit’, Polish withdrawal from the Union. How the EU issue plays out in Polish public opinion depends critically on how it is framed. If it is a question of Law and Justice vigorously asserting Poland’s interests – particularly on an issue such as enforced migration quotas, where the vast majority of Poles are hostile to EU policy – then it plays well for the ruling party. However, if the issue is framed in terms of whether the government’s actions threaten the material benefits that Poland receives from the EU, or the country’s membership, then it becomes extremely problematic for the ruling party. However instrumental they may have become in their attitudes towards the Union or misgivings they may have about specific EU policies, Poles continue to support membership overwhelmingly. For example, an October survey by the IBRiS agency for the ‘Rzeczpospolita’ newspaper found 84% of respondents (including 76% of Law and Justice voters) would vote for Poland to remain in the EU against only 8% who would vote to leave. With the salience of the European migration crisis having receded, the Polexit narrative appears to have become increasingly important as the way that many Poles frame the EU issue.

A referendum on Polexit?

The recent October/November local elections illustrated what a toxic slogan Polexit is for any mainstream politician to be associated with. Although Law and Justice won the highest share of the vote in elections to Poland’s 16 regional authorities, the best indicator of national party support, it performed poorly in medium-sized and larger towns, partly as a result of a much higher than usual turnout among the government’s opponents in these areas. Many commentators attributed this, at least in part, to the liberal-centrist opposition’s claim that Law and Justice was contemplating leaving the EU. A few days before the elections it emerged that justice minister Zbigniew Ziobro had asked the constitutional tribunal whether Polish judges had the right to refer queries on EU law to the Court of Justice. The opposition interpreted this as a pretext for Poland to ignore the Court’s verdict if the constitutional tribunal questioned the primacy of EU law in Polish affairs, arguing that undermining the EU treaties in this way could be a precursor to Polexit. Drawing analogies between the situation that led the UK to leave the EU, opposition leaders warned that frequent clashes between Warsaw and the EU political establishment could accidentally trigger a slow motion Polexit in the same way that Britain stumbled out of the EU. The debate was further ignited when the Court issued its preliminary injunction on the final day of election campaigning.

The local elections were the first of a series over the next 18 months with the European Parliament (EP) poll in May 2019, parliamentary election in the autumn, culminating in the summer 2020 presidential poll. EP elections are particularly difficult for Law and Justice. Its electorate is divided over EU issues and includes a substantial number of Eurosceptics, which makes it hard for the ruling party to develop a distinctive message. Turnout is very low (only 24% last time) but higher among better-off, urban voters who tend to support the liberal-centrist opposition, whose strategy will be to try and turn the EP elections into a de facto referendum on continued Polish EU membership. A good result would provide the opposition with a psychological boost and momentum in the run-up to the crucial autumn parliamentary poll. Law and Justice strategists were concerned that a European Court final ruling against the Polish government falling in the middle of the EP campaign would have provided further traction for the opposition’s Polexit narrative.

Neutralising the issue, leaving the core reforms intact

The government’s retreat over its supreme court reforms was, therefore, part of a concerted effort to defuse the Polexit issue. In recent weeks Law and Justice leaders have gone overboard to stress that the party is strongly committed to continued EU membership as a core element of Polish foreign policy. For sure, Law and Justice is Eurosceptic in the sense of being anti-federalist and wary of further extensions of EU competencies, but the dominant view within the party remains that it is in Poland’s interests to try to reform the Union from within. Indeed, party leaders argue out that the only leading politician to call for a referendum on this specific issue in recent years was actually the pro-EU Civic Platform leader Grzegorz Schetyna! A hopeful sign for Law and Justice was a November poll for the CBOS agency that found that only 16% of respondents felt Law and Justice wanted Polexit while 12% said the party actually favoured deeper EU integration.

At the same time, however, many Law and Justice supporters feel that the government has been too accommodating on this issue. The November CBOS survey also found that although, by a margin of 53% to 31%, Poles supported the government making concessions to EU institutions on its reforms, Law and Justice voters were opposed by 57% to 35%. The party has, therefore, tried to re-assure them that this was a price worth paying to neutralise the opposition’s Polexit narrative while retaining the core elements of the judicial reform programme. The majority of the National Judicial Council (KRS), the body that appoints judges and determines the functioning of the courts, is now selected by parliament (by a qualified three-fifths supermajority) rather than the legal profession. The justice minister retains broad powers to appoint and replace the heads of ordinary courts. Although for many Law and Justice supporters Mrs Gersdorf personifies the despised judicial establishment, her position is not critical to the reforms, while nearly 40 new supreme court judges (out of 110) have been appointed by the President, there are still 10 vacancies to fill, and the re-instated ones will gradually retire and be replaced. There are also two powerful new supreme court chambers dominated by new appointees: one dealing with disciplinary issues relating to the legal profession; the other overseeing a new ‘extraordinary appeals’ procedure that allows for the review of ‘wrongly passed’ court judgements from the past 20 years.

As a consequence, although the government is hoping that the judicial reforms will become less salient in framing public perceptions of Poland-EU relations, the issue is not going to disappear. While the Commission welcomed the re-instatement of the retired judges, it also indicated that it would not withdraw its Court of Justice referral, to prevent Warsaw from returning to the issue, and would continue with the Article 7 procedure over other contested issues. It also has an earlier European Court referral relating to the functioning of the ordinary courts (although not subject to the emergency mechanism). Indeed, the fact that the Court has proved to be more willing to intervene in the functioning of national judicial systems than many commentators anticipated has encouraged the government’s opponents to urge the referral of other disputed measures, particularly the National Judicial Council changes which are the real core of the reforms.

Focusing too much on Polexit?

How the Polexit issue plays out over the coming months could have a crucial impact on next year’s elections. It is a potentially extremely powerful weapon for the government’s opponents and, if the conflict between Warsaw and Brussels escalates and the elections become framed as referendums on continued Polish EU membership, Law and Justice could be in trouble. On the other hand, if the government’s opponents focus too much on the Polexit issue – and the ruling party develops a convincing counter-narrative that it is strongly pro-EU, and its conflict with the EU political establishment subsides – then the opposition could appear to have little else to offer Poles as a positive reason to support it.

Who really won Poland’s local elections?

The liberal-centrist opposition mobilised its core supporters in urban areas winning high profile mayoral races, but the right-wing ruling party won the more politically significant regional polls. Unless the opposition can broaden its appeal and attract more voters in smaller towns and rural areas, the governing party remains on track to win next year’s parliamentary election.

Opposition success in the larger towns and cities

Poland’s autumn local elections – the first of a series over the next year-and-a-half that will include European Parliament (EP) elections in summer 2019, parliamentary in autumn 2019, culminating in the summer 2020 presidential poll – were always going to be difficult for the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) grouping, the country’s ruling party since autumn 2015. This was partly due too high expectations, Law and Justice has been averaging over 40% in opinion polls, but mainly because much of the media focus was on mayoral contests in larger towns and cities where the ruling party is relatively weak.

Sure enough, the liberal-centrist Civic Platform (PO) – Poland’s ruling party between 2007-15 and currently the main opposition grouping – made a very strong showing in these urban areas, winning high profile mayoral races without the need for second round run-offs (to be held on November 4th where no candidate obtained more than 50%). Civic Platform was particularly buoyed by its surprisingly easy victory in Warsaw, the most prestigious and high profile contest which developed into a major strategic battleground between the government and opposition and set the tone for the campaign more generally. Here the uninspiring Civic Platform contender Rafał Trzaskowski won with 57% of the vote in spite of the extremely energetic campaign run by deputy justice minister Patryk Jaki, his Law and Justice-backed opponent.

Polish local elections normally see a higher turnout in small towns and rural areas, where Law and Justice enjoys strong support. This time, however, many urban liberal voters appear to have been mobilised by the fact that (albeit in different ways) both Law and Justice and the opposition presented these elections as a plebiscite on the ruling party’s transformative but highly controversial and polarising programme of socio-economic and systemic reforms. As the first nationwide elections after three turbulent years of Law and Justice government, many otherwise electorally passive urban voters were thus encouraged to use the local polls to pass a verdict on national politics. Overall, turnout was 55%, a record high for Polish local elections.

But Law and Justice wins the regional poll

However, as the only local government tier contested on national party lines, the aggregated share of the vote in elections to Poland’s 16 regional authorities was actually the best indicator of party support. Given that they play a major role in distributing EU funds and are a key source of local party patronage, the regional elections were also the most significant politically of the local government polls. Here the results were much more encouraging for Law and Justice which won 34% of the vote overall and emerged as the largest party in nine regional assemblies. This represented a 7% increase on its performance in the previous 2014 local elections, and the highest ever national vote share by a party in Polish regional polls. Civic Platform contested the elections as part of the ‘Civic Coalition’ (KO) in alliance with the smaller liberal ‘Modern’ (Nowoczesna) party (and a tiny left-wing grouping led by feminist activist Barbara Nowacka) which won 27% of the regional vote and is the largest grouping in seven assemblies. This was slightly more than the 26% secured by Civic Platform in 2014 but less than the 32% combined vote share of these two parties in the 2015 parliamentary election.

Given Law and Justice’s previous difficulties in building local coalitions – in 2014 the party won the most seats in six regions but only ended up governing in one of them, while Civic Platform secured control of the remainder either on its own or in coalition – there was concern that it would again struggle to secure control of regional authorities, even where it won the largest number of seats (3-5 was a realistic target). In fact, thanks to a counting system that favours larger parties, Law and Justice actually secured outright majorities in six regions and could take control of a seventh in coalition with non-party independents. Nonetheless, Law and Justice’s share of the vote was less than the 38% it won in the 2015 election and there was some disappointment that the party did not secure a larger electoral bonus for delivering on its costly but extremely generous social spending programmes.

Some commentators also felt that debates about possible ‘Polexit’, Polish withdrawal from the EU, during the last week of the campaign may have cost Law and Justice votes and helped to mobilise its urban liberal opponents. It emerged that justice minister Zbigniew Ziobro had asked the constitutional tribunal whether Polish judges had the right to refer queries on the interpretation of EU law to the European Court of Justice. The European Commission has referred a law reforming the Polish supreme court to the European Court, arguing that it violates EU law, and Mr Ziobro’s query was interpreted by the opposition as a pretext for Poland to ignore the Court’s verdict if the constitutional tribunal questions the primacy of EU law in Polish affairs. Although Law and Justice accused the opposition of manipulation, and denied vehemently that it had any plans to leave the EU, the government’s opponents argued that undermining the EU treaties in this way could be a precursor to de facto ‘Polexit’. The debate was further ignited when, on the final day of campaigning, the European Court issued a preliminary injunction ordering the immediate suspension of the supreme court law’s early retirement provisions until it could hear the Commission’s case.

Another reason why Law and Justice’s regional vote share was lower than its national opinion poll ratings, and why it was not been able to gain control of even more regional councils, was the fact that the ruling party did not succeed in eliminating the agrarian Polish Peasant Party (PSL), its main competitor in rural areas. The Peasant Party, Civic Platforms’s coalition partner in regional assemblies (and previously in government), secured 12% of the votes, well above the 5% that it has been scoring in national opinion polls. Nonetheless, this was still the Peasant Party’s worst local election performance since 2002 and its overall tally of regional councillors fell to only 70 from 157 in 2014 when it won a stunning 24% of the regional vote (although commentators questioned the reliability of these results). As a consequence, the party – primarily an office-seeking grouping which, critics argue, only survives because it has developed powerful networks of patronage and interest clusters at the local level – has lost considerable influence in the regions. Moreover, Law and Justice strategists believe that there is a segment of the rural electorate that may vote for the Peasant Party in local polls but supports the ruling party in parliamentary elections. Barely a year after its stunning 2014 local election performance the Peasant Party recorded its worst result in any post-1989 election and only just scraped over the 5% threshold for parliamentary representation.

The prime minister, opposition leader (and Mr Biedroń?) strengthened

The local elections were a key test of popularity for prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki, who took over the premiership last December but is relatively new to front-line politics, having worked in the banking sector before he joined the government as deputy prime minister for economic affairs (and later finance minister) in 2015. During the campaign, Mr Morawiecki became embroiled in a scandal following the publication of tape recordings of private conversations with business colleagues, held in Warsaw restaurants five years ago, which portrayed him in an unflattering light as a member of the post-communist business elite.

Nonetheless, Mr Morawiecki was generally felt to have fronted Law and Justice’s national campaign effectively and strengthened his position within the party. Crucially, he still enjoys the support of party leader Jarosław Kaczyński who, although he does not hold any formal state positions, exercises a powerful behind-the-scenes influence in determining the government’s programmatic and strategic priorities. On the other hand, Law and Justice’s poor results in the larger towns and cities suggest that Mr Morawiecki may have spent too much time shoring up his credibility among the party’s less well-off, provincial core electorate rather than trying to atttact new supporters among better-off, centrist urban voters; the potential for which was felt to be part of his original appeal as prime minister.

The local elections also confirmed the position of Civic Platform leader Grzegorz Schetyna as the leading figure within the liberal-centrist opposition. Mr Schetyna lacks dynamism and charisma, has been subject to constant criticism from the liberal-left media for his alleged ineffectiveness, and for many voters is too associated with the previous, discredited Civic Platform-led government (opinion polls show him to be Poland’s least trusted politician). However, he is an effective political operator who has restored purpose and discipline to a party shattered by its 2015 defeat. For sure, the ‘Civic Coalition’ regional vote fell short of the combined share its two main component parties secured in 2015. Nonetheless, the fact that it reduced Law and Justice’s lead to single figures convinced many (although by no means all) commentators that only an electoral alliance led by Mr Schetyna’s grouping is capable of mounting an effective challenge to the ruling party.

The clear loser in these elections was the Polish left. The once-powerful communist successor Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), which failed to secure parliamentary representation in 2015, was hoping to use the local elections to launch a comeback. However, it only secured 7% of the regional council vote and won 11 seats compared with 9% and 28 respectively in 2014 (felt, at the time, to be disappointing results). Smaller left-wing groupings performed even worse: the radical left ‘Together’ (Razem) party (which came from nowhere to win 3.5% of the vote in 2015), for example, only secured 1.6%. This creates an opening for Robert Biedroń – another political hopeful often touted as the left’s potential saviour, who decided not to stand for re-election as mayor of the provincial town of Słupsk. Mr Biedroń is waiting until next year to launch a new initiative, although he may struggle to carve out a niche in a political scene so polarised between the two large electoral blocs.

Law and Justice still on course to win?

One should be wary of drawing far-reaching national conclusions from local election results, but they can help us to identify certain trends ahead of next year’s crucial parliamentary poll. Despite its poor performance in urban areas, on the strength of the regional results Law and Justice still appears on course to emerge as the largest party – although with a lead of only 7% over the opposition this may not be enough for it to retain its outright parliamentary majority. The ruling party’s hope that its programme of large-scale social transfers would mobilise large swathes of (previously passive) beneficiaries to start voting for Law and Justice has yet to materialise, while its attempts to eliminate the Peasant Party as a challenger in rural areas also appear to have been unsuccessful. For its part, the ‘Civic Coalition’ has consolidated and mobilised its core liberal supporters, especially in urban areas, on the basis that it is the grouping best placed to defeat Law and Justice. However, the liberal-centrist opposition will struggle to win the parliamentary election if it cannot significantly dent the ruling party’s bedrock support in the countryside and smaller towns. And while the Peasant Party offered a challenge in rural areas, which reduced Law and Justice’s share of the regional vote and denied it control of some councils, no one expects the agrarian grouping to repeat their local election performance in next year’s parliamentary poll.

Why do Poland’s local elections matter?

The autumn local elections will be an important test of popularity for Poland’s government and opposition parties. Although it is riding high in the polls, they could be problematic for the right-wing ruling party because of high expectations, its low coalition potential, and the fact that the media focus is on mayoral contests in urban areas where it is relatively weak.

Difficult elections for the ruling party

On October 21st Poles will vote for thousands of councillors and local mayors in regional, county and parish elections; with second round run-offs two weeks later between the two most popular candidates in those mayoral contests where the winning candidate fails to secure more than 50%. The local elections are the first of a series over the next year-and-a-half that will include: European Parliament elections in summer 2019, parliamentary in autumn 2019, culminating in the summer 2020 presidential poll. Given Poland’s 16 regional authorities play a major role in distributing EU funds and are a key source of local party patronage, these are the most politically significant of the local government polls. As the only tier where elections are contested on national party lines, the aggregated share of the vote in the regional polls is also the best indicator of party support.

For the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) grouping, Poland’s ruling party since the autumn 2015 parliamentary election, they will be seen as a plebiscite on the government’s transformative but highly controversial programme of socio-economic and systemic reforms. In particular, they will be a key test of popularity for prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki, who took over the premiership last December and has been the main focus of the party’s national campaign. Although he previously held the post of deputy prime minister and finance minister, Mr Morawiecki is relatively new to front-line politics, having worked in the banking sector before he joined the government. After a shaky start, Mr Morawiecki grew quickly into his new role and is now one of Poland’s most popular politicians; widely touted as a potential successor to Law and Justice leader Jarosław Kaczyński who, although he does not hold any formal state positions, exercises a powerful behind-the-scenes influence in determining the government’s programmatic and strategic priorities.

In fact, these could be problematic elections for the ruling party. The fact that Law and Justice is registering impressive levels of opinion poll support (averaging over 40%) means that it has to manage extremely high expectations. Pundits are likely to view as a disappointment: anything significantly less than the 38% share of the vote that the party secured in the 2015 election; and a lead of less than ten percentage points over the largest opposition grouping. But many Poles who vote in local elections do not do so in national ones (and vice versa) making it difficult to read off party support from opinion polls, while the main parties’ overall share of the vote could be diluted by support for local civic committees in some regions.

At the same time, Law and Justice has weak coalition potential so if it does not win outright majorities then it will struggle to secure control of many regional authorities, even where it wins the largest number of seats. In the previous 2014 local elections, Law and Justice won the most seats in six regional assemblies but only ended up controlling one of them, while the liberal-centrist Civic Platform (PO) – Poland’s ruling party between 2007-15 and currently the main opposition grouping – secured control of the remainder either on its own or in coalition with other parties. This time, Law and Justice is hoping to take control of at least half of the regional councils, although 3-5 is probably a more realistic target. Moreover, much of the media focus will be on the results of the high-profile mayoral contests in Poland’s large towns and cities, where Law and Justice is relatively weak. Victory in any of these would be a major success for the ruling party.

Kukiz’15’s performance could be key

A key factor determining whether Law and Justice’s high share of the vote translates into control of regional authorities could be the performance of the anti-establishment Kukiz’15 grouping, currently the ruling party’s only realistic potential coalition partner. After its leader, rock star Paweł Kukiz, caused a political sensation in the 2015 presidential election – when, standing as an independent right-wing ‘anti-system’ candidate, he finished third picking up one-fifth of the vote – the newly-formed Kukiz’15 grouping emerged as the third largest in the subsequent parliamentary poll securing 9%. Since then, Kukiz‘15 has maintained a reasonably stable electoral base (especially among younger voters), averaging around 7-8% in opinion polls.

However, the local elections will be exceptionally difficult for Kukiz’15 because they favour established parties with well-developed grassroots organisation. After Mr Kukiz fell out with many of the local government and civic activists who formed the backbone of his 2015 presidential campaign, his grouping has failed to build up such networks. This is exacerbated by the fact that Kukiz’15 has not registered as a formal political party, thereby making it ineligible for ongoing state funding. Even securing 5% in the regional elections would, therefore, be a substantial achievement for Kukiz’15.

An important test for Mr Schetyna

Civic Platform is contesting the elections as part of the so-called ‘Civic Coalition’ (KO) in alliance with the smaller liberal ‘Modern’ (Nowoczesna) party. In September they were joined by the left-wing Polish Initiative (IP), a marginal grouping but led by high-profile feminist activist Barbara Nowacka who earlier this year spearheaded an unsuccessful attempt to liberalise Poland’s abortion law. Civic Platform hopes that by bringing Ms Nowacka on board the Coalition can strengthen its appeal to socially liberal voters in urban areas, although the move risks alienating moderate conservative voters that the party also needs to win over.

The local elections are a key test for Civic Platform leader Grzegorz Schetyna who lacks dynamism and charisma (opinion polls show him to be Poland’s least trusted politician) but is an effective political operator who has restored a sense of discipline and purpose to the party. Mr Schetyna has been subject to constant criticism from the liberal-left media for his alleged ineffectiveness, and for many voters is too associated with the previous, discredited Civic Platform-led government. Nonetheless, the party retains much greater political assets than any other opposition grouping – including substantial financial resources and a relatively well-developed grassroots base – and better-than-expected local election results would provide it with a major boost in the run-up to next year’s decisive parliamentary poll. A good outcome for the ‘Civic Coalition’ in the regional polls would be to secure at least the combined vote share that Civic Platform and ‘Modern’ won in 2015 (32%), and limit the Law and Justice lead to single figures. On the other hand, losing control of a significant number of regional authorities, or symbolic defeats in large towns or cities currently run by prominent Civic Platform politicians, would severely undermine Mr Schetyna’s leadership and raise questions about the effectiveness of the ‘Civic Coalition’ formula.

The most prestigious and high profile contest is the Warsaw mayoral election which has developed into a major strategic battleground between the government and opposition setting the tone for the local election campaign more generally. As is the case with most Polish cities, Warsaw is a liberal heartland and extremely difficult territory for Law and Justice but the party’s candidate, deputy justice minister Patryk Jaki, has run an extremely energetic campaign. Mr Jaki has benefited from his high profile role as chair of a special government-appointed commission investigating irregularities in the return of Warsaw properties confiscated under communist rule. Even many of the government’s critics have praised his efforts in seeking redress for ordinary citizens who lost out as a result of the so-called ‘reprivatisation’ process. At the same time, although he was once touted as a future party leader, Civic Platform candidate Rafał Trzaskowski has been uninspiring and found himself on the defensive as Law and Justice has reminded voters of his links to the party-backed incumbent Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz whose reputation has been severely damaged by the ‘reprivatisation’ scandal. However, although the opinion poll gap has narrowed, Mr Trzaskowski remains favourite to win and a Law and Justice victory in Warsaw, one of Civic Platform’s electoral bastions, would be a political sensation.

Rural areas are a key battleground

One of the key local election battlegrounds has been the bitter competition for rural votes between Law and Justice and the agrarian Polish Peasant Party (PSL). Although it was Civic Platforms’s junior governing partner and is in coalition with Mr Schetyna’s party in most regional councils, the Peasant Party decided not to join the ‘Civic Coalition’. The party had its worst result in any post-1989 election in 2015, only just scraping over the 5% threshold for parliamentary representation, and is currently hovering around this level of support in national polls. However, it has tried to refresh its image by electing Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz – one of a new generation of young, articulate party activists – as leader, and some commentators argue that the party is slowly re-building its support among rural voters. Law and Justice strategists are concerned that there is a segment of this electorate that may vote for the ruling party in national elections but support the Peasant Party in local polls, and has taken a number of high-profile initiatives aimed at boosting its support in the countryside, including replacing the unpopular agriculture minister.

In fact, the Peasant Party always performs much better in local than national elections due to its strong grassroots organisational base and the fact that turnout in rural areas, that form the bedrock of its support, is always higher in these polls. Indeed, in 2014 the party won a stunning 24% of the regional assembly vote; although Law and Justice supporters questioned the reliability of these results. The fact that the Peasant Party is primarily an office-seeking grouping – which, critics argue, has developed powerful networks of patronage and interest clusters at the local level – means that the stakes are extremely high and securing anything less than 10% in the regional elections will be interpreted as a sign that it is in serious, possibly terminal decline.

A comeback for the ex-communists?

The local elections are also an important test for the once-powerful communist successor Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), which failed to secure representation in the last parliamentary election but has made something of a comeback and is now third in most opinion polls, averaging around 8-9%. Notwithstanding the Alliance’s extensive local organisation and access to substantial state party funding, this was driven largely by the revival of debates about the country’s communist past prompted by Law and Justice legislation affecting the interests of its core electorate: those who, due to their personal biographies, have positive sentiments towards, or direct material interests linking them to, the previous regime. The Alliance will be looking to match, or even improve on, the 9% that it secured in the 2014 regional elections.

In fact, no political current is more divided in these elections than the left. The Polish Initiative split over Ms Nowacka’s decision to throw her lot in with the ‘Civic Coalition’, with critics pointing out that Civic Platform and ‘Modern’ parliamentary deputies have failed to take a decisive stance on the abortion issue. The radical left ‘Together’ (Razem) party, which unexpectedly emerged from nowhere to win 4% of the vote in the 2015 election (enough to obtain state funding but not parliamentary representation), is running separately from the Alliance but has failed to build on its earlier momentum. Meanwhile, Robert Biedroń, another political hopeful often touted as the left’s potential saviour, has decided not to stand for re-election as mayor of the provincial town of Słupsk and is waiting until next year to launch a new political initiative.

 

What are the prospects for Poland’s President Andrzej Duda?

Poland’s right-wing President remains the country’s most popular politician largely because Poles approve of his style rather than any substantive policy achievements. But his presidency lacks a clear defining concept and is driven by the, sometimes conflicting, aims of trying to provide balance to the political scene while remaining loyal to the ruling party’s governing programme.

Independent actor or ineffective ‘notary’?

Although Polish President Andrzej Duda – who was elected in May 2015 as candidate of the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) grouping, currently Poland’s ruling party – has political ambitions that transcend his constitutional position, he has struggled to carve out an independent role for himself. Poland has a predominantly parliamentary system but the presidency is not purely ceremonial and, in addition to a strong electoral mandate, retains some important constitutional powers; most significantly a suspensive veto that requires a three-fifths parliamentary majority to overturn, which the current government lacks.

However, Mr Duda got off to a problematic start when, almost immediately after Law and Justice took office in November 2015, he was forced to take sides in an extremely controversial and polarising dispute over the membership of the country’s constitutional tribunal, a powerful body that rules on the constitutionality of Polish laws. The new government annulled the appointment of five tribunal judges elected to the 15-member body by the previous parliament who, it argued, were not nominated legally; a view strongly contested by the main opposition parties and most of Poland’s legal establishment. Mr Duda did not accept the judges’ oaths of office and subsequently swore in another five nominated by the new parliament. For many of his critics, these initial actions defined the nature of Mr Duda’s presidency as Law and Justice’s ‘notary’ who uncritically approved all of the government’s key decisions, however controversial.

The closest that Mr Duda has come to emerging as a fully autonomous political actor was in July 2017 when, in a dramatic and surprising move, he vetoed two flagship government laws overhauling the country’s supreme court and National Judicial Council (KRS), a body that selects judges and decides how the courts are run, which the opposition claimed were unconstitutional. However, the revised versions of the laws that Mr Duda proposed, and were approved by parliament last December, were actually very close to the government’s original proposals. The Judicial Council would still be dissolved and a majority of its new members nominated by parliament rather than judges’ organisations, but there was now a stronger guarantee that the election would be by a three-fifths rather than simple majority, forcing the ruling party to negotiate appointments with opposition deputies. Moreover, instead of all of the current supreme court judges having to stand down (except those re-instated by the President from a list approved by the justice minister) only those over the age of 65 would be obliged to retire with Mr Duda deciding if their term could be extended.

Even if one does not accept the argument that these amendments were purely cosmetic and simply aimed at expanding Mr Duda’s own powers, as the judicial reform debate wore on perceptions of the President’s role shifted so that he came across increasingly as taking the government’s side in the dispute rather than as an independent arbiter. Indeed, Mr Duda always backed the fundamental objectives of the government’s reforms, but simply felt that its original proposals went too far in expanding the powers of the justice minister in his capacity as chief prosecutor.

The judicial reform vetoes did not, therefore, blunt opposition criticisms of Mr Duda for failing to block controversial government initiatives, such as when, rather than vetoing the ‘anti-defamation law’ passed at the end of January, he referred it to the constitutional tribunal (in fact, virtually all opposition deputies either abstained or voted in favour of the law when it was debated in parliament). This law imposed fines and criminal penalties of up to three years imprisonment for anyone found guilty of falsely ascribing responsibility or co-responsibility to the Polish nation or state for the crimes committed by Nazi Germany. It led to a huge diplomatic row with Israel and the USA, Poland’s key international ally, who claimed that the law could restrict public testimony by Holocaust survivors.

The President’s critics also argue that Mr Duda has been ineffective in carrying forward any independent political initiatives. This was exemplified by his proposal to hold a consultative referendum in November, to coincide with the centenary of Poland regaining its independence after 123 years of foreign rule, on possible amendments to the country’s Constitution. Mr Duda proposed 10 questions including: whether Poles wanted the retirement age, state benefits for families, and Poland’s place in the EU and NATO enshrined in the Constitution; and if the President should have greater powers, and the Constitution refer to the country’s Christian values and heritage. In the event, at the end of July the Law and Justice-dominated Senate – Poland’s second chamber, whose consent is required to hold referendums – rejected the President’s proposal by 30 votes to 10 with 52 abstentions. Most Law and Justice Senators abstained, criticising the proposed timing and fearing very low turnout could damage both the ruling party and President’s prestige.

Autonomous, loyal to the ruling party or both?

Mr Duda’s supporters point to the fact that the President has blocked high profile legislation that is important to the ruling party. In July 2007, in addition to the two judicial reform bills he vetoed a law extending the supervisory powers of regional audit chambers, which would have given the government greater oversight over Poland’s 16 regional authorities, all but one of which are currently controlled by opposition parties. Then, last March he refused to sign a government-sponsored ‘degradation law’ which provided a legal means to demote army officers who had ‘put Poland’s national interests in jeopardy’ when the country was under communist rule, on the grounds that there were no legal means for challenging these demotions

Only last month, Mr Duda refused to sign a Law and Justice bill simplifying Poland’s complex system of voting for European Parliament (EP) members. Under the new rules, voters would have elected at least three MEPs in each of the country’s 13 electoral districts; previous regulations did not allocate a fixed number which varied according to local turnout. Mr Duda argued that these amendments would further depress EP election turnout (already the second lowest level in the EU) and severely damage the principle of proportionality, marginalising political groupings such as the right-wing anti-establishment Kukiz’15 which is often seen as a presidential ally. Estimates suggested that the changes would have raised the effective threshold for representation from the current 5% to between 8-21% depending on the size of the electoral district and distribution of votes, which could have resulted in Poland’s 52 EP seats being shared out between the two largest parties: Law and Justice and the liberal-centrist Civic Platform (PO), the ruling party between 2007-15 and currently the main opposition grouping.

Mr Duda’s supporters also point to his apparent foreign and defence policy successes. Although foreign affairs lie within the government’s domain, the Constitution gives the President an informal oversight and co-ordinating role, and he can exert influence through international visits and high-profile speeches. The President is also commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Mr Duda’s supporters claim that he played a key role in the July 2006 Warsaw NATO summit’s decision to strengthen Poland’s defence infrastructure by deploying an international battalion on the country’s territory. Mr Duda also helped to secure the replacement of defence minister Antoni Macierewicz, with whom he had clashed repeatedly, in January’s government reshuffle.

His supporters also argue that the government has implemented two of Mr Duda’s most important domestic policy pledges: the introduction of the extremely popular ‘500 plus’ child subsidy programme for the first children of poorer households and every second and subsequent child in all families; and reversal of the previous Civic Platform government’s deeply unpopular pension reforms, which had increased the retirement age to 67 (from 60 for women and 65 for men). However, the political credit for these reforms has gone mainly to the government while Mr Duda’s critics point out that he has failed to deliver on two of his other flagship promises: substantial increases in tax allowances, and help for foreign currency (mainly Swiss franc) mortgage holders who had lost out as a result of the depreciation of the Polish złoty.

In fact, Mr Duda is torn between two, sometimes conflicting, logics. On the one hand, he wants to be taken seriously as an important member of the governing camp’s leadership and consulted fully on its key strategic, programmatic and personnel decisions. At the same time, he feels instinctively uncomfortable about the idea of one political formation dominating the public sphere and sees his role as a pluralising and stabilising influence on Poland’s polarised political scene. More pragmatically, Mr Duda knows that to secure re-election in summer 2020 he cannot simply rely on the votes of the Law and Justice hard core and needs to reach out to the political centre.

On the other hand, Mr Duda broadly shares Law and Justice’s political philosophy and perspectives on most issues and agrees with much of its critique of the alleged dysfunctionality of the post-communist state and its core institutions. His disagreements are over how radical the reforms should be and the best means of achieving them. The President has also not shown any interest in sponsoring his own independent political formation and knows that he needs both Law and Justice’s organisational support base and its core, right-wing voters if he is to secure re-election. Moreover, it is also in the ruling party’s interests to re-assure more moderate, centrist voters that Mr Duda is using the presidency to check the government’s more radical measures, providing this does not impact negatively upon the core of its governing programme; which is why the opposition is so keen to portray him as simply a Law and Justice ‘notary’.

Popular but lacking a defining concept

Mr Duda’s initiatives can, therefore, often come across a series of confusing and contradictory short-term tactical manoeuvres rather than being part of a thought-through longer-term plan, and sometimes risk alienating core supporters while leaving doubters unconvinced. However, Mr Duda can clearly connect with ordinary Poles and makes great efforts to reach out to the often-forgotten parts of provincial Poland which constitute the Polish right’s core electoral base. He also has an ability to come across as ‘Presidential’, particularly when making set-piece speeches on major state occasions. Moreover, many Poles understand instinctively that the Constitution leaves the President with limited room for independent political manoeuvre and, therefore, judge him on his style rather than any specific policy achievements.

Consequently, Mr Duda remains extremely popular: an August survey conducted by the CBOS polling agency found that he enjoyed a 66% approval rating, the highest of any Polish politician, while 58% were satisfied with the way that he was performing his duties. Most polls also suggest that he would win re-election against hypothetical challengers, the most serious of which appears to be European Council President and former Civic Platform prime minister Donald Tusk.

However, these ‘headline’ polls can be misleading, hiding more subtle, underlying negative trends; Mr Duda’s Civic Platform-backed predecessor Bronisław Komorowski enjoyed even higher approval ratings but still failed to secure re-election in 2015. Moreover, if (as currently appears unlikely, but still quite possible) the opposition wins the next parliamentary election, scheduled for autumn 2019, Mr Duda will find himself under relentless attack from a new government seeking to de-legitimise his presidency by accusing him of complicity in Law and Justice’s alleged violations of the Constitution. At that point, it could become more of a problem if Mr Duda still appears to lack a clear concept of what defines his presidency, especially if a serious challenger emerges around whom all the (still very substantial) anti-Law and Justice opposition can coalesce.

How is Poland’s judicial reform conflict affecting its political scene?

Controversy surrounding the right-wing government’s judicial reform programme has undermined its strategy of pivoting to the centre in the run-up to Poland’s forthcoming electoral marathon. But in spite of misgivings about the reforms the ruling party is in tune with Poles on the social and economic issues they care most about, and the opposition offers little alternative beyond defence of an unpopular judicial status quo.

Threatening the rule of law or reforming a closed elite?

There are three key elements to the judicial reform programme introduced by the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party, Poland’s governing party since autumn 2015. Firstly, ending the terms of office of the majority of the National Judicial Council (KRS), a body that selects judges and decides how the courts are run, and selecting their successors by a qualified three-fifths parliamentary supermajority rather than the legal profession as had previously been the case. Secondly, giving the justice minister broad powers to replace the heads of lower courts. Thirdly, lowering the retirement age for supreme court judges from 70 to 65, except for those re-instated by Law and Justice-backed President Andrzej Duda based on recommendations from the National Judicial Council.

Most of the opposition – led by the liberal-centrist Civic Platform (PO), the country’s governing party between 2007-15 – and legal establishment strongly criticised the reforms arguing that they undermined the independence of the courts and infringed the key democratic principle of constitutional separation of powers. Warning of a drift towards authoritarian rule, the government’s opponents said that, by putting judicial appointments under political control, these reforms allowed Law and Justice to pack the courts with its own, hand-picked nominees; pointing out that the supreme court rules on the validity of national election and referendum results.

The judicial reforms were also heavily criticised by the EU political establishment and Western opinion-forming media, with whom the opposition enjoys close links and many of whom share their dislike of Law and Justice. The European Commission has been involved in an ongoing ‘rule of law’ dispute with the Law and Justice government since January 2016, initially over the membership and functioning of the country’s constitutional tribunal. At the end of last year, in a major escalation of the conflict, in response to the judicial reforms the Commission initiated an action against Poland under Article 7 of the European treaties which it can invoke against EU member states where it feels there is a ‘systemic threat’ to democracy and the rule of law; threatening Warsaw with sanctions, including possibly suspending its European Council voting rights.

The government’s supporters, on the other hand, argued that the reforms were in line with the Constitution and sorely needed because Polish courts were too slow, deeply inefficient and tolerated frequent irregularities and corrupt practices. Overhauling the courts is one of the most important elements of Law and Justice’s programme because the party believes that, following the country’s flawed transition to democracy in 1989, the judiciary, like many key Polish institutions, was expropriated by an extremely well-entrenched, and often deeply corrupt, post-communist elite, which then co-opted a new legal establishment that perpetuated its legacy. The judicial elite, they said, viewed itself as a superior ‘special caste’ out of touch with ordinary citizens, and operated as a ‘state within a state’ incapable of reforming itself. In these circumstances, they argued, making judges and their supervisory bodies more accountable to elected bodies was justifiable and in line with practices in other established democracies.

Conflict over supreme court retirements

The new supreme court early retirement provisions, which came into effect at midnight on July 4th and affected 27 of its 73 members, have proved particular contentious. Nine of these justices requested an extension to their terms of office and submitted the required formal documentation to the President, four did so by simply stating that they could not be dismissed, and a further three cited the provisions of the Constitution. 11 supreme court justices did not seek an extension, including first president Małgorzata Gersdorf who argued that her six-year term of office, which ends in 2020, could not be shortened because it was constitutionally guaranteed.

The government and Mr Duda responded that the Constitution also says that parliament determines the retirement age of supreme court judges and, as she did not submit a request to prolong her term, Mrs Gersdorf officially retired and could not continue as first president. They also said that that one of her deputies, Józef Iwulski, was acting president until the post could be filled permanently. Mrs Gersdorf, on the other hand, argued that Mr Iwulski was merely deputising for her as a temporary replacement in cases of her absence; she went on vacation shortly after the new provisions came into effect (Mr Iwulski shared this interpretation of his role).

At the same time, the European Commission launched the first stage of a legal action against Poland, arguing that the new early retirement provisions threatened the principle of judicial independence enshrined in the EU’s charter of fundamental rights, giving Warsaw one month to respond. The case could end up in an infringement procedure against Poland before the European Court of Justice; which could, in turn, issue an injunction ordering Warsaw to suspend the supreme court judge replacement process until it has determined its verdict.

Law and Justice responded by introducing legislation to accelerate the process of appointing a new, permanent supreme court head. The amendments, approved swiftly by parliament (without proper debate, according to the opposition), make it easier to appoint new supreme court judges and reduced (from 110 to 80) the number required in the court’s general assembly to nominate candidates from which Mr Duda will choose the new first president. The government said that the amendments were needed to end the state of uncertainty in the supreme court and prevent the threat of obstruction of new appointments. However, some commentators argued that Law and Justice wants the new supreme court judges and leadership to be in place as soon as possible to make the judicial reforms irreversible by the time that the European Court of Justice comes to examine the case.

Undermining Law and Justice’s pivot to the centre

Law and Justice argues that it was elected to office with a mandate to overhaul the judiciary. For sure, an August 2017 survey conducted by the CBOS agency found that 81% of respondents (including 74% of Civic Platform voters) felt that judicial reform was necessary while only 10% were against. However, while Poles certainly have many misgivings about the functioning of their country’s judicial system they are also wary of the government’s specific reforms. For example, a July survey conducted by the IBRiS agency for the ‘Rzeczpospolita’ newspaper found that 54% of respondents evaluated them negatively and only 39% positively. Only 18% said they would increase trust in Polish courts (25% reduce trust, 15% make no difference); 25% that they would increase the independence of the courts (48% reduce independence, 14% no difference); and 28% said they would make them more efficient (43% reduce efficiency, 14% no difference).

Moreover, some commentators argue that, by polarising the political scene around such a sharp conflict, the judicial reform controversy has undermined Law and Justice’s strategic objective of calming social protests and shifting the focus of debate in the second half of the government’s parliamentary term away from more controversial issues in order to broaden the ruling party’s appeal to more centrist voters. With the passage of the judicial reform laws at the end of last year, many of the key of elements of the government’s radical state re-construction programme were felt to be in place. One of the main objectives of the change of prime minister last December and government reshuffle in January was, therefore, to stabilise and consolidate Law and Justice’s position ahead of a series of key elections: local government in the autumn, European Parliament in summer 2019, parliamentary in autumn 2019, culminating in the summer 2020 presidential poll.

Why no backlash?

Nonetheless, opinion poll support for Law and Justice is holding up well, averaging around 40%, roughly the level that the party achieved in the 2015 parliamentary election and at least 10 percentage points ahead of Civic Platform. At the same time, protests against the government’s judicial reforms – which last year were held in dozens of towns and cities and attracted thousands of Poles – were much smaller this time around and appeared to mobilise a less diverse cross-section of the public, with notably fewer young people involved.

So why has there not been more of a political backlash against the government’s reforms? Although many Poles have misgivings about Law and Justice’s approach to constitutional questions, they also find these kinds of issues rather abstract. For sure, the July IBRiS/’Rzeczpospolita’ survey found that 70% of respondents said that they were interested in the supreme court reforms (33% very interested) and 63% that they ‘affected them directly’ (31% to a significant extent). However, it is questionable whether they have detailed knowledge of the dispute, and often tend to view it as a political conflict rather than through a legal-constitutional lens. Indeed, the opposition have not been able to convince ordinary Poles that anything really extraordinary is happening in the country as far as the state of democracy is concerned because their rhetoric often does not to accord with the latter’s everyday experiences. For many Poles, for example, the anti-Law and Justice privately-owned media still appears to provide a powerful counter-weight to pro-government public broadcasting. At the same time, Law and Justice is more in tune with public opinion, and appears to have delivered, on the social and economic issues which Poles most about.

Moreover, although they are not necessarily convinced by the government’s reforms, most Poles are very critical of the way that the courts currently function so the judicial establishment does not have a bank of goodwill that the opposition can draw on to mobilise support. For example, a February 2017 CBOS survey found that 51% of respondents said that they evaluated the Polish judicial system negatively compared with 36% who viewed it positively (only 2% very positively). Among the most commonly cited problems were: the protracted nature of trials (48%), court proceedings being too complicated (33%), and judicial corruption (30%). Moreover, while focusing on Mrs Gersdorf as the visible symbol of resistance to the reforms gave the opposition an opportunity to ‘personalise’ the dispute in a way that could make it intelligible for Poles unfamiliar with the intricacies of how the supreme court works, she does not have the personality of a ‘political fighter’. Indeed, Mrs Gersdorf’s often-inconsistent behaviour – declaring that she would not comply with the new law but then going on holiday at a crucial moment during the anti-reform protests – confused and demobilised the government’s opponents. At the same time, Law and Justice’s argument that the reforms were aimed at freeing the court system from the country’s non-democratic past were re-inforced when it emerged that Mr Iwulski had participated in seven political trials involving sixteen anti-regime oppositionists and was a reserve officer of the military counter-intelligence service (WSW) during the communist period.

Flawed reforms better than the status quo?

Perhaps most importantly, the opposition has not really offered any credible alternative to the government’s judicial reforms other than defending a status quo that most Poles feel is deeply flawed. An August 2017 CBOS survey, for example, found that while only 23% of respondents trusted Law and Justice on this issue (64% distrusted) only 6% trusted Civic Platform (79% distrusted). Even if Poles are dubious as to whether the government’s reforms will significantly improve the functioning of the judicial system, Law and Justice has been effective at convincing many of them that, for all its faults, it is at least trying to tackle a problem which previous administrations appeared content to ignore.

How will Poland’s ‘rule of law’ dispute with Brussels play out in national politics?

Poland’s ‘rule of law’ dispute with the European Commission is becoming increasingly entangled in the country’s domestic politics. How this plays out will depend on whether Poles hold the government responsible for the threat of EU sanctions and reduced fiscal transfers, or believe the opposition is putting the national interest at risk in order to gain political advantage.

Linking the ‘rule of law’ and EU funds

Last month, Grzegorz Schetyna – leader of liberal-centrist Civic Platform (PO), Poland’s governing party between 2007-15 and currently the main opposition grouping – claimed that the Commission would ‘freeze’ EU funds due Poland in the Union’s 2021-27 budget because of the failure of the current government – led, since autumn 2015, by the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party – to respect the ‘rule of law’. These funds would be ‘unfrozen’ if Civic Platform won the next parliamentary election, scheduled for autumn 2019. Poland is currently the largest beneficiary of EU fiscal transfers, which many commentators see as crucial to the country’s economic modernisation.

Mr Schetyna was referring to the fact that, in its May proposal for the next EU budget, the Commission outlined plans to link the distribution of so-called ‘cohesion spending’, used predominantly to fund public investment in less well-off states like Poland, to ‘rule of law’ adherence. Under the new instrument, the Commission could suspend, reduce or restrict access to EU funding if it felt that there were ‘generalised deficiencies’ in the investigation and prosecution of fraud or corruption, or an individual member state’s judicial system undermined the determination of court cases, relating to the management of EU funds. The decision to suspend funds could only be over-turned by a qualified majority in the EU Council, giving the Commission much greater leeway in determining whether there should be sanctions against member states.

The Commission proposed this new regulation in part because of its ‘rule of law’ dispute with the Law and Justice government which has been ongoing since January 2016. At the end of last year, in a major escalation of the conflict the Commission initiated an action against Poland under Article 7 of the European treaties for what it considered ‘systemic threats’ to the independence of the country’s courts, threatening Warsaw with sanctions, including possibly suspending its European Council voting rights. The Commission’s original concerns stemmed from a dispute over appointments to, and the functioning of, Poland’s constitutional tribunal, but in July 2017 were widened to include the Law and Justice government’s controversial judicial reform programme. The Commission agreed with criticisms articulated by Poland’s legal establishment and most opposition parties that the reforms allowed the ruling party to pack the courts and judicial bodies with its own nominees, which meant that the constitutionality of legislation could no longer be guaranteed.

The government’s supporters argued that the reforms were in in line with the Constitution and sorely needed because Polish courts were too slow, deeply inefficient and tolerated frequent irregularities. Law and Justice believes that, following the country’s flawed transition to democracy in 1989, the judiciary, like many key Polish institutions, was expropriated by an extremely well-entrenched, and often deeply corrupt, post-communist elite, which then co-opted a new legal establishment that perpetuated its legacy. They also accused the Commission of bias and double standards, arguing that the reforms were in line with practices that existed in other established Western democracies, and said that Law and Justice had been singled out because it is out of favour with the socially liberal and multi-cultural policies supported by the EU political establishment, and has been robust and assertive in advancing the country’s national interests.

Seeking reconciliation with Brussels

However, earlier this year Law and Justice tried to seek reconciliation with Brussels. Last December, party leader Jarosław Kaczyński – who, although he does not hold any formal state positions, exercises a powerful behind-the-scenes influence in determining the government’s programmatic and strategic priorities – installed finance minister and respected former international banker Mateusz Morawiecki as the country’s new prime minister. Mr Morawiecki struck a more emollient tone than his combative predecessor Beata Szydło, who had a fraught relationship with the Commission, and it was hoped that he could ‘re-set’ Warsaw’s relations with the EU political establishment. Law and Justice was concerned that a lengthy and debilitating dispute with Brussels could alienate more moderate Poles, the vast majority of whom remain supportive of their country’s EU membership, and overshadow Polish-EU relations.

In addition to the new ‘rule of law’ regulation, the Commission has proposed both a sharp reduction in traditional EU spending areas such as cohesion funds and changing the criteria for their allocation so that, in addition to a region’s GDP per capita, they would include new indicators less advantageous to Poland. As a consequence, Poland is expected to lose 23% of its cohesion fund monies in the next EU budget. The Polish government argues that the current 2014-20 budget was always likely to be the last from which the country benefited so substantially given that British withdrawal from the Union would reduce the overall level of the funding available, and Poland’s GDP has been increasing steadily while new EU spending priorities have emerged. The government’s critics, on the other hand, say that the cuts reflect the fact that Law and Justice has found itself marginalised within the EU’s decision making structures and alienated the major European powers. Either way, Warsaw was hoping to defuse the ‘rule of law’ row so that it could focus on building an effective ‘friends of cohesion’ coalition in the forthcoming budget negotiations.

Consequently, the government tried to open up a dialogue with Brussels and amended some aspects of its judicial reforms. These modifications included: removing the justice minister’s ability to fire the heads of lower district and appeal courts without consultations with local judicial bodies and the National Judicial Council (KRS), a body which selects judges and decides how Polish courts are run; equalising the retirement ages for male and female judges; the President, rather than justice minister, determining which supreme court judges could continue in office when they reached retirement age; allowing the publication of three disputed 2016 constitutional tribunal rulings that had previously been blocked by the government; and restricting the number of bodies that could initiate the new ‘extraordinary appeals’ procedure that allows for the re-opening of ‘wrongly passed’ verdicts from the last 20 years.

No change to the core of the reforms

However, the government’s critics argued that these changes were largely cosmetic pointing out that, for example: the justice minister had already dismissed 150 of the 730 local chief judges; the majority of the National Judicial Council was still selected by parliament rather than the legal profession (albeit by a qualified three-fifths supermajority); and the three disputed constitutional tribunal rulings had been superseded by later legislation and were published with the caveat that the decisions had been taken unlawfully. Indeed, even though government supporters argued that the concessions represented a significant demonstration of Warsaw’s willingness to compromise, they left the core of the reforms – allowing elected bodies a greater say in the functioning of the courts and appointments of judges and their supervisory bodies to make the judiciary more accountable – intact.

Consequently, although the renewed dialogue initially improved relations between Warsaw and Brussels, the Commission felt that the Polish government’s concessions did not address its main concerns. The fate of the 27 (out of 72) supreme court justices who were obliged to stand down on July 3rd as a result of the reduction in their retirement age from 70 to 65 – including the court’s first president Małgorzata Gersdorf whose six-year term of office was, the government’s critics argued, stipulated in the Polish Constitution and is refusing to resign – still depended upon Law and Justice-backed President Andrzej Duda. Moreover, the ‘extraordinary review’ procedure could still be initiated by the justice minister (in his capacity as chief prosecutor) and, the Commission felt, threatened the stability of Poland’s legal system. For its part, Warsaw expressed doubts as to whether the Commission was acting in good faith and insisted that it could make no further concessions.

As a result, the Commission decided to push ahead with the Article 7 procedure and an initial formal hearing was held at the June EU General Affairs Council. However, to move to the next stage of the procedure, 22 of the Council’s remaining 27 members (Poland is excluded) will have to vote that the Polish reforms constitute a ‘clear risk of a serious breach of the rule of law’. Even then, a subsequent vote to trigger sanctions requires unanimity and the Hungarian government for one has made it clear that it will oppose any such moves. At the beginning of July, the Commission also decided to launch an infringement procedure against Poland before the European Court of Justice, arguing that the new early retirement provisions for supreme court judges threatened the judicial independence enshrined in the EU’s charter of fundamental rights, which could also carry heavy financial penalties for Warsaw. Frustration with the limits of the Article 7 process also helps to explain why Brussels is proposing the new regulation linking the disbursal of EU funds to ‘rule of law’ compliance.

A risky strategy?

While many Poles have misgivings about aspects of the government’s judicial reforms, they are also very dissatisfied with the way that Polish courts function and also find constitutional issues such as this rather abstract. Nonetheless, the liberal-centrist opposition sense that the proposed ‘rule of law’ regulation provides an opportunity to link these questions to the more salient issue of Polish access to EU funds. Last month, Civic Platform appeared to be testing this strategy in the run-up to the autumn local elections, suggesting that Law and Justice’s ‘rule of law’ dispute with Brussels could damage investments and modernisation projects in every locality. If this works then the link between the ‘rule of law’ and EU funds could become a major issue in both the summer 2019 European Parliament and autumn 2019 national elections. However, even those EU member states taking the Commission’s side against Poland in the ‘rule of law’ dispute may be reluctant to give Brussels such sweeping powers, and while the regulation could be approved by a simple majority Warsaw has suggested that it is prepared to veto the whole EU budget (which requires unanimous support) to block it if necessary.

Moreover, for Civic Platform’s strategy to work Poles need to perceive a very clear link between the ‘rule of law’ dispute and possible suspension or reduction of EU funds. But the new budget will not come into effect (and may not even have been agreed) before the 2019 elections. At the same time, although Poles are overwhelmingly pro-EU they are also wary about the Union’s institutions becoming involved in the country’s internal affairs and there is a risk that the opposition will become too associated with (and, therefore, end up getting the blame for) possible EU sanctions. A good example of this risk was a statement last month by Civic Platform’s Warsaw mayoral candidate Rafał Trzaskowski who went further than Mr Schetyna and suggested that his party had actually persuaded Brussels to freeze Poland’s EU funds rather than withdraw them altogether. Mr Trzaskowski thus implied (even if that was not necessarily his intention) that Civic Platform was exploiting its links with EU political elites, who share their dislike of Law and Justice, to conduct behind-the-scenes negotiations on how Poland’s EU funds should be withheld unless Mr Schetyna’s party wins the elections. By doing so, he left Civic Platform open to the charge that it was jeopardising the national interest to gain political advantage. How Poland’s ‘rule of law’ dispute with the EU political establishment plays out in domestic politics, therefore, depends critically on who frames the terms of the debate most successfully, and whom Poles blame for the threat of EU sanctions or reduced fiscal transfers.

What are the prospects for Poland’s rock star-politician Paweł Kukiz?

Although Polish rock star-politician Paweł Kukiz’s political grouping is an unstable construct, lacking organisational and programmatic coherence, it remains the right-wing ruling party’s only potential coalition partner and could still emerge as king-maker after the next parliamentary election. The key to its survival and future success is still Mr Kukiz’s continued credibility as an ‘anti-system’ fighter against the political establishment.

Struggling to carve out a niche

Three years ago, rock star and social activist Paweł Kukiz caused a political sensation when he finished third in the first round of the May 2015 Polish presidential election, picking up more than one fifth of the vote. Standing as an independent right-wing ‘anti-system’ candidate, Mr Kukiz’s signature issue, and main focus of his earlier social activism, was strong support for the replacement of Poland’s current list-based proportional electoral system with UK-style single-member constituencies (known by the Polish acronym ‘JOW’), which he saw as the key to renewing politics. Then, in spite of running a poor campaign, his newly-formed Kukiz ’15 grouping emerged as the third largest following the October 2015 parliamentary election, securing 8.8% of the vote and 42 seats in the 460-member Sejm, the more powerful lower chamber of the Polish parliament.

However, Mr Kukiz’s eclectic candidates list produced an ideologically diverse, and potentially extremely unstable, parliamentary caucus comprising: liberal-conservatives, libertarians, nationalists, trade unionists, local civic activists, businessmen and campaigners for single-member constituencies. Attempts to develop a series of satellite associations or platforms representing different ideological and programmatic strands (trade union-agrarian, libertarian, nationalist and electoral reformers) proved unsuccessful. The most high profile of these – the so-called ‘Endecja’ association, which tried to draw on the traditions of the pre-war ‘National Democracy’ movement inspired by Polish nationalist politician Roman Dmowski – fizzled out after its leaders left the Kukiz ’15 parliamentary caucus.

Not surprisingly, therefore, Mr Kukiz’s grouping has struggled to develop a distinctive political identity, particularly given that the Polish political scene has become highly polarised since the 2015 elections between supporters of the government, led by the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party, and the liberal-centrist (so-called ‘total’) opposition. While its supporters appear divided in their attitudes towards the Law and Justice government, Kukiz ’15 has tried to position itself as a ‘constructive’ opposition. Consequently, for a long time Mr Kukiz was the only opposition politician to maintain regular contacts with Law and Justice leader Jarosław Kaczyński – who, although he does not hold any formal state positions, exercises a powerful behind-the-scenes influence in determining the government’s programmatic and strategic priorities.

Mr Kukiz’s grouping also tried not to become directly involved in the bitter, ongoing conflicts between Law and Justice and the liberal-centrist opposition over constitutional issues. While often criticising the government’s handling of these disputes, Kukiz ‘15 refused to join other opposition groupings in street protests organised by the anti-government Committee for the Defence of Democracy (KOD), leading to accusations that it was Law and Justice’s informal coalition partner. Kukiz ’15 also strongly opposed moves by the European Commission to invoke the so-called Article 7 ‘rule of law’ procedure against the Polish government, and, tapping into widespread popular concerns about the potential security and societal cohesion risks posed by mass Muslim migration, backed Law and Justice in its vehement opposition to Poland being obliged to accept migrants from the Middle East and North Africa under the EU’s compulsory relocation scheme.

Strained relations with the ruling party

However, over time Kukiz ’15 has become increasingly critical of the Law and Justice government. It has continued to try and position itself as the most genuinely reformist ‘anti-system’ political grouping by, for example, promoting more direct democracy and referendums triggered by civic initiatives. In some respects, Kukiz ’15 has also developed into one of the most pro-free market groupings currently represented in parliament, criticising what it sees as excessive business and economic regulation by state officials. At the end of last year, it clashed bitterly with Law and Justice when the government proposed an amendment to the local election law abolishing single-member constituencies (Kukiz ‘15’s signature issue) in councils covering more than 20,000 residents. Kukiz ‘15’s harshest criticisms, however, have been of party-linked appointments to state bodies and what it argues are the continued privileges enjoyed by state officials and political elites under the Law and Justice administration, as part of a broader critique of the phenomenon that it refers to as ‘partocracy’.

Last summer, Mr Kukiz also attempted to develop a political alliance with Poland’s Law and Justice-backed President Andrzej Duda after the latter vetoed two of the government’s flagship judicial reform laws in July. Mr Kukiz tried to present these vetoes as a major political success for his grouping. However, the judicial reform bills were eventually passed in a modified form with Mr Duda’s support, and nothing materialised from speculation that Mr Kukiz could play a key role in attempts to build a new ‘presidential’ political party, other than a further deterioration of the rock star-politician’s relations with the ruling party.

Maintaining a stable base of support

The only common denominator uniting Kukiz ’15’s disparate ideological tendencies appeared to be their opposition to the constitutional foundations of the post-1989 Polish state and its dominant elites, together with a vague ‘anti-systemness’ that Mr Kukiz was felt to embody. This led many commentators to predict that the grouping would implode as soon as it was forced to confront issues that brought its ideological incoherence to the fore. For sure, 14 deputies have left the Kukiz ‘15 parliamentary caucus since the election, six of whom formed the ‘Free and Solidaristic’ (WiS) parliamentary circle led by legendary former anti-communist activist Kornel Morawiecki. Mr Morawiecki was elected on the Kukiz ’15 ticket but is now a strong supporter of the government; not surprisingly, given that his son Mariusz has been Law and Justice prime minister since last December and was previously deputy prime minister responsible for economic affairs. However, partly because it has been prepared to tolerate a relative lack of parliamentary voting discipline, the Kukiz ’15 caucus has not disintegrated and is still the third largest with 29 members.

Moreover, opinion polls suggest that Kukiz ‘15 has actually maintained a reasonably stable electoral base: the ‘Pooling the Poles’ blog that aggregates voting intention surveys currently shows the grouping averaging around 8% support. In spite of the fact that Mr Kukiz has not really come up with any new ideas or initiatives, and his grouping can point to very few substantive political achievements since the election (apart from securing a few nominees on public broadcasting and judicial supervisory bodies), a substantial bloc of voters clearly still feels that Mr Kukiz has remained true to his ‘anti-system’ principles and is the most credible opponent of the political establishment. This widespread anti-establishment feeling is particularly (although not exclusively) evident among younger voters: an August-September 2017 survey conducted by the CBOS polling agency, for example, found that 56% of Kukiz ‘15 voters were in the 18-35 age category (which comprises only 25% of the electorate as a whole) and 20% of them were under 25 (7% of the electorate). Many of these younger voters originally supported Mr Kukiz because they became increasingly disillusioned with a status quo that appeared to offer them an invidious choice between moving abroad to take jobs that fell well short of their abilities or remaining in a country which they felt offered them few prospects for the future. Three years later, many of them still do not identify with either Law and Justice or the liberal-centrist opposition.

A pivotal role in the future?

Indeed, Kukiz ’15 could still play a pivotal role in Polish politics because it is currently Law and Justice’s only realistic potential coalition partner if the ruling party should fail to secure an outright majority at the next parliamentary election, scheduled for autumn 2019. This is quite likely: had the United Left (ZL) electoral coalition won only 0.4% more of the votes at the 2015 election then it would have crossed the parliamentary representation threshold and thereby deprived Law and Justice of its majority. The same scenario could also play out after this autumn’s local elections in many of Poland’s 16 regional assemblies, the only local government tier contested on national party lines. Although in the previous 2014 local polls Law and Justice won the largest share of the vote in half of these regional authorities, because of its weak coalition potential it was only able to secure control of one of them: Podkarpackie province, where the party won an outright majority of council seats. Without the backing of Kukiz ’15, therefore, Law and Justice could once again fail to take a control of regional authorities even where it wins the largest number of seats.

The problem for Kukiz ’15 is that council elections, because they require political groupings to stand thousands of local candidates, favour established parties with well-developed grassroots organisational structures. Kukiz ’15 has failed to build up such networks and its leader fell out with many of the local government and civic activists who formed the backbone of his 2015 presidential election campaign, so it has had to advertise for candidates on the Internet. This is exacerbated by the fact that Kukiz ’15 did not register as a formal political party, thereby making it ineligible for ongoing state funding; a decision which, given its vote share at the last election, has cost the grouping around 7 million złoties per annum. Kukiz ’15’s objectives for these local elections are, therefore, fairly modest: crossing the 5% threshold (which political groupings require to secure parliamentary representation nationally) in the aggregated nationwide share of the regional council vote; and achieving at least some minor, symbolic victories in local mayoral elections.

Mr Kukiz’s popularity remains the key

Kukiz ’15 remains an unstable political construct and the grouping’s lack of organisational and programmatic coherence, together with its socially and ideologically heterogeneous electoral base, casts serious doubts over its future prospects. Since the collapse of communism in 1989, Poland has seen a series of ‘anti-system’ parties emerge, some winning as much as 10% of the vote, only to then fizzle out and disappear. Kukiz ’15 could easily end up as simply the latest, transitory repository of such protest votes. At the same time, however, there is also a good chance that Mr Kukiz’s grouping will survive to contest the next parliamentary election and possibly even emerge as the king-maker in the new parliament. Although Mr Kukiz’s apparent unpredictability and shifting political allegiances may have put Law and Justice off the idea of working with him as a coalition partner, Mr Kaczyński’s party may not have any choice if it wants to secure control of a significant number of regional authorities after the autumn local elections, or remain in government after the next parliamentary poll.

In fact, the key to Kukiz ‘15’s continued political success, and even survival, remains its leader’s personal credibility and popularity. Surveys conducted by CBOS have consistently found Mr Kukiz to be among Poland’s top three or four most popular politicians: in May he secured a 50% approval rating (20% disapproval), way ahead of any other opposition leaders. Although he can be gaffe-prone and react emotionally under pressure, Mr Kukiz’s impulsive behaviour outside of established political norms – which would be fatal for more mainstream politicians – is viewed by many of his supporters as evidence of his authenticity. This support could erode very quickly if they cease to see him as the most credible fighter against ‘the system’ but, for the moment, his supporters seem to be willing to give Kukiz ’15 the benefit of the doubt, and back the grouping as long as they continue to view its leader as the embodiment of opposition to the Polish political establishment.